1. Provide an analysis of which three markets (not listed in Exhibit 3) are the most attractive choices for GENICON based on non-financial data, such as:

• Ease of Doing Business Rankings (http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankingsLinks to an external site.Links to an external site.)
• Corruption Perception Index (http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overviewLinks to an external site.)
• Hofstede Index (https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/Links to an external site.)

CASE - AFTER THE BRICS: CHOOSING FROM OTHER EMERGING MARKETS

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Richard Ivey School of Business The University of Western Ontario IVEY 9B12M116 AFTER THE BRICS: CHOOSING FROM OTHER EMERGING MARKETS Allen H. Kupetz and Gary Haberland wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality. Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation prohibits any form of reproduction, storage or transmission without its written permission. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 3K7; phone (519) 661-3208; fax (519) 661-3882; e-mail cases@ivey.uwo.ca. Copyright 2013, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation Version: 2013-01-21 Toward the end of 2012, Gary Haberland, president and founder of GENICON, a U.S.-based manufacturer and distributor of medical devices for laparoscopic surgery, faced a happy dilemma: deciding which international market to enter next. After the company's success in Europe and other developed markets, GENICON had tackled Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC countries) from 2009 to 2011. He was now eagerly prepared to pursue other emerging markets. Haberland had become knowledgeable about the challenges of attempting to conduct business in markets where the rule of law was fluid. He had first-hand experience in markets that were initially successful, but had withered away as a result of a change in government that led to a new set of regulations and other barriers to entry. Unlike most start-up companies that had succumbed to the pressures of the medical device industry, GENICON had established its presence and experienced prosperity by focusing, since the early stages of its launch, on its international distribution strategy. For GENICON to continue thriving, it would need to identify, evaluate and develop new markets that offered geographic diversity. Although the United States had long been the world's largest minimally invasive surgical (MIS) market, for the foreseeable future, international markets were anticipated to grow at an exceptional rate compared with the U.S. market (see Exhibit 1 for global growth projections by region). International success did not negate GENICON's need to identify the market it should enter next. For a firm the size of GENICON, entering a new market meant a high capital investment and high risk. Furthermore, because the initial investment time and realization of revenues spanned up to three years, entering many different markets simultaneously was simply not feasible. Richard Ivey School of Business The University of Western Ontario IVEY 9B12M116 AFTER THE BRICS: CHOOSING FROM OTHER EMERGING MARKETS Allen H. Kupetz and Gary Haberland wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality. Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation prohibits any form of reproduction, storage or transmission without its written permission. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 3K7; phone (519) 661-3208; fax (519) 661-3882; e-mail cases@ivey.uwo.ca. Copyright 2013, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation Version: 2013-01-21 Toward the end of 2012, Gary Haberland, president and founder of GENICON, a U.S.-based manufacturer and distributor of medical devices for laparoscopic surgery, faced a happy dilemma: deciding which international market to enter next. After the company's success in Europe and other developed markets, GENICON had tackled Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC countries) from 2009 to 2011. He was now eagerly prepared to pursue other emerging markets. Haberland had become knowledgeable about the challenges of attempting to conduct business in markets where the rule of law was fluid. He had first-hand experience in markets that were initially successful, but had withered away as a result of a change in government that led to a new set of regulations and other barriers to entry. Unlike most start-up companies that had succumbed to the pressures of the medical device industry, GENICON had established its presence and experienced prosperity by focusing, since the early stages of its launch, on its international distribution strategy. For GENICON to continue thriving, it would need to identify, evaluate and develop new markets that offered geographic diversity. Although the United States had long been the world's largest minimally invasive surgical (MIS) market, for the foreseeable future, international markets were anticipated to grow at an exceptional rate compared with the U.S. market (see Exhibit 1 for global growth projections by region). International success did not negate GENICON's need to identify the market it should enter next. For a firm the size of GENICON, entering a new market meant a high capital investment and high risk. Furthermore, because the initial investment time and realization of revenues spanned up to three years, entering many different markets simultaneously was simply not feasible.