Sherman may have grounds to void the golf course deal on the basis of incapacity. According to
Question:
Sherman may have grounds to void the golf course deal on the basis of incapacity. According to theRestatement (Second) of Contracts 15, "A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a transaction if by reason of mental illness or deflect." Sherman may argue that he has severe bipolar disorder, which implies that he frequently experiences abrupt mood swings between periods of intense depression and practically crazy enthusiasm, and also the fact that he was not taking his medication regularly, to prove his case of serious mental illness. Earlier that day, Sherman tried to kill himself with a kitchen knife, slashing his wrists in the bathtub, but was unsuccessful.His suicide attempt that day, and other times, and the testimony from physicians about his mental state at the time of the deal could be crucial evidence to support his claim.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 18C (Tent. Draft No. No. 1, April 13, 1964).1 and also,RICHARDC.ALLEN,ELYCEZENOFFFERSTER&HENRYWEIHOFEN,MENTALIMPAIRMENT ANDLEGALINCOMPETENCY253, 260-282 (1968); Note,Mental Illness andthe Law of Contracts, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1020, 1036 (1959), where it is recommended"that a complete test for contractual incapacity should provide protection to thosepersons whose contracts are merely uncontrolled reactions to their mental illness, aswell as for those who could not understand the nature and consequences of theiractions."The Ortelere dissent in Pennsylvania advocated a more lenient standard, arguing that a party may be unable to act reasonably and may not have had an understanding of the implications of the arrangement, which could result in the contract being void. With these broader standards, Sherman's lawsuit might have a higher chance of success.
The issue is whether the Employee's actions are a breach of contract with the Employer. The rule that governs this issue is Restatement (Second) of Contracts 188, Ancillary Restraints on Competition, which describes the relationship between the unreasonableness of a promise not to compete between an employee and an employer. The Voluntary Termination clause defines three terms: the employee must agree not to practice veterinary medicine within Arlington, Texas, or a 10-mile radius of the animal clinic. Secondly, there is no advertisement or notification of departure to clients. Lastly, the agreement states there shall be no notification of a new location practicing veterinarian services within three years of departure from Employer.
In defense of the Employee, a veterinarian is a licensed professional, much like a medical professional or an attorney, and to deprive their clients of the right to choose a trusted professional would be in dissent of the majority agreement of the Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber case. Additionally, three years to abstain from contacting clients is greater than the need for the Employer to hire a replacement for the employee, as stated in the majority opinion of Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber. Much can occur in three years, and the agreement would cause undue hardship for the promisor (Employee) and the public (clients) in which he serves, R2K 188 (1).
In defense of the Employer, such as in the Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber case, the Employer is protecting its current and future clientele, which is required for continued business. Such an employer needs a reasonable amount of time to replace the Employee and recoup business, as was the dissent in Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber. Likely there is no shortage of veterinarians in Arlington, Texas. Thus, competition is likely fierce, and the toll from an Employee taking his clients upon leaving the Employer could be detrimental to future business.
In conclusion, the Employer's non-compete agreement is likely too broad to uphold in court per the ruling of Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber and R2K 188(1). However, Arlington, Texas, may be a highly competitive city for veterinarian clinics which may justify the severity of the non-compete agreement. More context would be needed to fight for the employer adequately. However, regarding the Employee and Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber ruling, the Employer's agreement would not be enforceable in court due to R2K 188 (1).
Smith and Roberson Business Law
ISBN: 978-0538473637
15th Edition
Authors: Richard A. Mann, Barry S. Roberts