1999 CHERRY HILLS SUBDIVISION LANDSLIDE

On the night of August 3, 1999, a massive landslide occurred in Cherry Hills subdivision in Antipolo City, Rizal province, Philippines that resulted to about 60 death toll and 378 houses buried. The landslide was primarily caused by the heavy rains of the approaching typhoon Olga. The subdivision became a death trap when its foundations was filled with water and the whole complex slid down the hill on which it was built.

Topography

Cherry Hills subdivision was home to hundreds of families paying-off low cost, concrete houses. The subdivision was owned and developed by Tirso Santillan, president of Philjas Corporation. The subdivision was located in Antipolo City, Rizal and was situated in an elevated terrain cut along the perches of the Sierra Madre mountains. Besides its location on the mountain cuts, Cherry Hill was flanked by two subdivision on its either sides. The eastern summit is at elevation of 255 meters while the western side is at elevation of 233 meters. The subdivision cut from the mountain side is approximately 26 meters at its deepest.

The subdivision encompasses five hectares with paved roads. The subdivision consisted of light-roofed one or two-storey houses with hollow block wall construction that are either single-detached or row houses.

The Tragic Event

Before the landslide occurred, several residents evacuated to the nearby town when cracks began manifesting on the walls of their houses. Tell-tale signs about a possible impending slide was rumored, and ominous signs Of changes in elevation and ground movements have been observed.

At around 7:30 pm, on August 3, 1999, the landslide occurred. The warning signs were there five years before the tragedy occurredhairline fissures on the walls and pavements of the subdivision. But like many warnings, those that were noticed in Cherry Hills in Antipolo City were either misread or ignored. Residents and developers blamed each other. The former accused the latter of using substandard materials for the low-cost housing project. Developers insisted that the housing renovations made by the residents had caused the fissures.

By the time both sides realized the gravity of the situation, it was too late. As they prepared to leave the area amid the heavy rains, residents found themselves trapped in their own homes. Houses slid down the subdivision's slopes, putting those in the lower areas under 45,000 cubic meters of mud, rocks, and concrete. People were buried alive. At least 58 people died that rainy day of Aug. 3, 1999.

Much soul-searching and finger-pointing have been made since. In September last year, a local court ordered the arrest of three officials of the Philippine-Japan Solidarity Corp., which built the subdivision. The officials including company president Tirso Santillan, general manager Hiiroshi Ogawa, and assistant general manager Eleazar Rodriguezwere charged with violation of presidential decree 957 or the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree. They posted bail.

Early this year, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board ordered the company to pay damages estimated at P89 million and return the payments previously made by the residents. The company has appealed the decision.

Blame the Rains

Heavy rains triggered the disaster. Rainfall measurements three days prior to the landslide were equivalent to 120 days of normal rainfall in a rainy season, according to a report of a fact-finding committee. Actual rainfall recorded during that period totaled 523.3 millimeters. The normal amount of rainfall for the entire month of August, based on a 35-year record in the weather bureau's Quezon City observation station, was 517.3 millimeters.

Developers claim that the unusually huge volume of water that seeped into Hill 255, where Cherry Hills was located, caused enough pressure that triggered the subdivision's collapse. But geologists based in the University of the Philippines (UP) argue that while heavy rains may have set off the disaster, they claim that certain geological characteristics of the area made the subdivision vulnerable to landslide. The rains could not have been the sole factor behind the tragedy, they add.

Post-mortem examination by the same geologists noted that the rock bed under the houses consisted of alternating porous and impervious rocks as well as a significant amount of clays "of probably the swelling type." They concluded that "expandable clays when saturated with water are natural planes of slippage." The natural slope of the ground, its sparse vegetation, as well as preexisting fractures in its rock bed made the land area very weak.

Had a geological survey been done before the houses were built, the disaster could have been avoided, according to UP geologists. The study would have determined the presence of fissures, the composition of the soil and rocks in the area, and their reaction to seismic and other potential disturbances, they add. The developers would have been advised to adjust their construction plan to prevent a disaster. But the same geologists tell Newsbreak that those structural interventions would have made the cost of the project prohibitive for the low-income sector. "Engineers will always say they can remedy anything," says Dr. Victor Madiambayan, who conducted the study on Cherry 1 tills. But the question is whether developers are willing to spend more for it, he adds.

Given the huge backlog in mass housing, developers of low-cost housing units in the past were not strictly subjected to environmental regulations, according to a source at the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MG13) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The same source says that until the Cherry Hills disaster, developers were not required by the department to conduct environmental impact assessments of their target area. "To get an environmental compliance certificate all they had to do was submit a project description," he says.

The reason has everything to do with cost. It's easy to ask qualified geologists to conduct an engineering, geological, and geohazard assessment (EGGA) of a housing project. One could hire an expert for P60,000 or even lower. But developers will then have to follow recommendations made by the same geologists to ensure that the buildings they will construct are structurally sound. These could inflate construction costs.

Still in Court

On the night of Aug. 3, 1999, a massive landslide destroyed more than 300 homes and killed at least 59 people at Cherry Hills Subdivision in Antipolo City. The disaster occurred after days of rain. More than 500 millimeters of rain had fallen from Aug. 1 to Aug. 3, breaking a 35 year record.

Cherry Hills was developed by Philippine-Japan Solidarity Corp. (Philjas), but even early on, many buyers had complained that the developers failed to complete the project as planned.

Inspection by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-following the tragedy found that the project was built on very unstable ground and did not have a sufficient drainage system. The bureau also said the area wa5 vulnerable to ground slippage because of a dangerous slope to the west. Phiijas Corp. disputed the findings, saying that nobody "could have prevented what happened in Cherry Hills." But it later gave each family P15,000, and another P10,000 to those who lost a member.

A Senate investigation concluded that the disaster "was not force majeure" as the developer claimed, but a result of the negligence of the developer and of government agencies, which failed to enforce rules on the construction of lowcost homes. The Senate report cast blame on the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the Antipolo City government and Phiijas for the destruction and deaths.

In December 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of five housing and environment officials for "gross neglect of duty" in relation to the disaster and asked that 13 other housing, environment and Antipolo City officials be suspended.

Several residents filed criminal charges in the Antipolo Regional Trial Court against Phiijas officials Hiroshi Ogawa, Tirso Santillan and Eliezer Rodriguez, accusing them of failing to complete the development of the subdivision. However, the Antipolo City prosecutor's office dismissed the cases, citing lack of basis. This prompted the residents to bring the case to the Department of Justice.

In August 2002, then Justice Secretary Hernando Perez ordered the filing of a criminal information against the developers for failing to complete the subdivision.

In April 2004, Santillan, Rodriguez, Timoteo Layos and Virgilio Garcia pleaded not guilty to charges of reckless imprudence. Sixto Caday had died, while Ogawa had apparently fled or was in hiding.

In June 2009, Santillan pleaded not guilty to charges of reckless imprudence before the Antipolo RTC Branch

74. Judge Mary Josephine Lazaro issued warrants of arrest for Ogawa and Rodriguez, who had also disappeared.

Questions to Ponder:

1. How is the triple bottom line violated by this tragedy? Explain.
2. Are there malpractices in business ethics in this case? How could CSR been practiced to have avoided this problem? Explain.
3. What CSR view could have been used in this case so that the event had not happened? Defend your answer.
4. What responsibilities should have been applied in this case to have prevented the tragedy? How about after the tragedy? Discuss.