1. What does the plaintiff allege are the tied and tying products or services?
2. How does the court determine what the relevant market is in this case? Why is the relevant market not defined as Marathon franchisees, as they are the ones subject to this credit card processing requirement?
3. Why does the court conclude that there is not illegal tying going on here? Is it likely that the plaintiff has other economically viable choices available to it?

The plaintiffs, a Marathon dealer in Indiana and a company owned by him to whom he assigned his dealership contract, filed suit against Marathon under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, charging it with tying the processing of credit card sales to the Marathon franchise .. The tying arrangement is challenged under section 1 of the Sherman Act rather than section 3 of the Clayton Act because the things alleged to be tied—the franchise and the processing service—are services rather than commodities. The standards for adjudicating tying under the two statutes are now recognized to be the same.