Consider again, as in exercise 27.11, the political incentives for legislators that represent districts. In exercise 27.11,
Question:
A: Now suppose that the projects in question are not private goods but rather local public goods; that is, suppose that the benefit B of a project in district i is a benefit that each of the n residents of district i enjoy equally.
(a) In what way do your answers to A (a) through A (f) of exercise 27.11 change?
(b) Does your basic conclusion from exercise 27.11 still hold?
(c) Next, suppose that each project, while located in one district, benefits all N n citizens of the country equally; i.e. suppose that projects are national public goods without geographic boundaries in which benefits are contained. Does your basic conclusion change now?
(d) True or False: The extent to which the fraction of projects requested by legislators is inefficient depends on the degree to which the benefits of the project are national rather than local.
B: Now consider the way we modeled these issues in part B of exercise 27.11. Each district gets a project, with the costs and benefits varying with the size of the project. The cost of providing y in a district is again c (y) = Ayα, but the benefit of the project is reaped by each of the n residents of the district—i.e. the benefit is b(y) = Bnyβ. Assume again that α > 1 and β ≤ 1.
(a) Repeat B (b) through B (e) of exercise 27.11 and determine yeq and y∗.
(b) Are the projects again inefficiently large? How does the inefficiency vary with N?
(c) Next, suppose that the benefits of each project are spread across all n N citizens. Derive yeq and y∗ for this case of each project being a national public good.
(d) Is there still an inefficiency from having legislators requesting projects for their districts?
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Microeconomics An Intuitive Approach with Calculus
ISBN: 978-0538453257
1st edition
Authors: Thomas Nechyba
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