Consider the following simple offshoring model of the type described in Section 11.2. The United States and
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(a) Suppose that we know that Task 2 is done only in the United States because logistical problems or tariffs make it infeasible to do it in Mexico. Then Tasks 2 and 3 are done in the United States, while Task 1 is done in Mexico. Suppose we know that R = 1.2. Use the labor market clearing conditions for Mexico to find the Mexican wages, then use the labor-market clearing conditions for the United States to find the U.S. wages. Show that the wages you have computed satisfy the zero-profit condition (to a reasonable approximation), so you have indeed computed a full equilibrium.
(b) For the equilibrium you have just completed, verify that it would be cheaper to conduct Task 2 in Mexico rather than the United States, so if radio manufacturers were able to offshore it, they would do so.
(c) Now, suppose that it becomes feasible to do Task 2 in Mexico. Then Task 3 is done in the United States, while Tasks 1 and 2 are done in Mexico. Suppose we know that R = 1.63. Use the labor-market clearing conditions for the United States to find the U.S. wages then use the labor-market clearing conditions for Mexico to find the U.S. wages. Show that the wages you have computed satisfy the zero-profit condition (to a reasonable approximation), so you have indeed computed a full equilibrium.
(d) What is the effect of the off shoring of Task 2 on wage inequality in the two countries? What is the effect on the skilled-unskilled employment ratio?
(e) Who benefits from the offshoring of Task 2? Who is hurt by it? Why? Analyze in detail.
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