In 1985, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. The purpose of the Act was to reduce the federal deficit by setting a maximum deficit amount for fiscal years 1986 to 1991, progressively reducing the budget deficit to zero by 1991.
If the federal budget deficit failed to be reduced as the Act required, an automatic budget process was to take effect. The Comptroller would calculate, on a program-by- program basis, the amount of reductions needed to meet the target. He or she would then report that amount to the President, who was required to issue a sequestration order mandating these reductions. (A sequestration order directs spending levels to be reduced below the levels authorized in the original budget.) Unless Congress then acted to modify the budget to reduce the deficit to the required level, the sequestrations would go into effect.
The Comptroller, unlike the employees of the executive branch and agency officials, does not serve at the pleasure of the President. He or she can be removed from office only by Congress.
Opponents of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act argued that the Comptroller’s role in the automatic budget process was an exercise of executive functions. Because the Comptroller was controlled by Congress, they argued that this role violated the constitutional requirement of separation of powers. Were they right? [Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).]