Professor Clemens has two students enrolled in his riverboat pilot course, Huck and Tom. The final exam counts as 100 percent of the course grade. If one student passes the exam and one student fails, Professor Clemens announces that he will assign the passer an A and the failer an F. If both students pass, he will give them both Bs. If both students fail, he will give them both Cs. Assume that if each student studies, he passes the exam; if he doesn’t study, he fails. Finally, assume that although studying is hard, either student would prefer to study and get an A or a B than not study and get a C or lower.

a. Write out the payoff matrix for Tom and Huck, clearly labeling strategies and identifying payoffs for each player for each combination of strategies (the payoffs will be letter grades).

b. What is each player’s dominant strategy?

c. What will be the outcome of the game? Explain your answer.

d. Could Huck and Tom benefit by cooperating (i.e., coordinating their strategies in this game)? Why or why not?

e. Now suppose that Professor Clemens decides to penalize Huck for talking in class. He tells Huck that if he passes the exam and Tom does not, Huck will get a C instead of an A. All other payoffs will remain the same. What will be the likely outcome if the test is only offered once? What will be the likely outcome if the test is offered 50 times?