1. Why does the Court say it cannot be involved in ongoing monitoring of political ads, documentaries, and other forms of communication?

2. Why are independent expenditures by corporations different from corporate donations and funding of candidates?

3. Are time restrictions and unflattering portraits grounds for regulating political speech? Why or why not?

In January 2008, Citizens United released a film entitled Hillary: The Movie (Hillary), a 90-minute documentary about then-senator Hillary Clinton, who was a candidate in the Democratic Party’s 2008 presidential primary elections. Most of the commentators in the film were quite critical of Senator Clinton. Hillary was released in theaters and on DVD, but Citizens United wanted to increase distribution by making it available through video-on-demand.

Citizens United produced two 10-second ads and one 30- second ad for Hillary. Each ad included a short, pejorative statement about Senator Clinton, followed by the name of the movie and the movie’s Web site address. Citizens United wanted to run the advertisements on broadcast and cable television.

The Federal Election Commission (FEC) wanted to stop Citizens United from running the ads and Citizens United brought suit, seeking a preliminary injunction against the FEC. The District Court denied Citizens United a preliminary injunction and granted the FEC summary judgment.

Citizens United requested and was granted certiorari.

JUDICIAL OPINION

KENNEDY, Justice … The narrative [of Hillary] may contain more suggestions and arguments than facts, but there is little doubt that the thesis of the film is that she is unfit for the Presidency.

Citizens United argues that Hillary is just “a documentary film that examines certain historical events.” We disagree. The movie’s consistent emphasis is on the relevance of these events to Senator Clinton’s candidacy for President. Courts, too, are bound by the First Amendment. We must decline to draw, and then redraw, constitutional lines based on the particular media or technology used to disseminate political speech from a particular speaker.

The law before us is an outright ban, backed by criminal sanctions. Section 441b makes it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy corporations— either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a general election. Thus, the following acts would all be felonies under § 441b: The Sierra Club runs an ad, within the crucial phase of 60 days before the general election, that exhorts the public to disapprove of a Congressman who favors logging in national forests; the National Rifle Association publishes a book urging the public to vote for the challenger because the incumbent U.S. Senator supports a handgun ban; and the American Civil Liberties Union creates a Web site telling the public to vote for a Presidential candidate in light of that candidate’s defense of free speech. These prohibitions are classic examples of censorship. Section 441b’s prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech. Were the Court to uphold these restrictions, the Government could repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the various points in the speech process. If § 441b applied to individuals, no one would believe that it is merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose and effect are to silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect. Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.

The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each. The Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations. Government lacks the power to ban corporations from speaking.

The First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the speaker’s ideas. There is simply no support for the view that the First Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech by media corporations. The Framers may not have anticipated modern business and media corporations.

Yet television networks and major newspapers owned by media corporations have become the most important means of mass communication in modern times.

When word concerning the plot of the movie Mr. Smith Goes to Washington reached the circles of Government, some officials sought, by persuasion, to discourage its distribution. [I]t, like Hillary, was speech funded by a corporation that was critical of Members of Congress.

Mr. Smith Goes to Washington may be fiction and caricature; but fiction and caricature can be a powerful force. Speech would be suppressed in the realm where its necessity is most evident: in the public dialogue preceding a real election. Governments are often hostile to speech, but under our law and our tradition it seems stranger than fiction for our Government to make this political speech a crime. Yet this is the statute’s purpose and design. The judgment of the District Court is reversed with respect to the constitutionality of § 441b’s restrictions on corporate independent expenditures.