In 2006, Eunice and Lloyd Smith Sr. executed a will that bequeathed their home and land to their three sons (Lloyd Jr., Martin, and Derrell) equally as tenants in common. Eunice and Lloyd Sr. appointed Lloyd Jr. as their attorney-in-fact.
Lloyd Sr. died in 2009. Eunice then signed a new power of attorney replacing Lloyd Jr. with Martin as her attorney-in-fact. In 2010, Eunice executed a new will in which she appointed Martin as her executor and bequeathed all of her property to him contingent upon the payment of $10,000 to Lloyd Jr. and Derrell.
Medical records indicated that Eunice began to show signs of dementia in 2010. Eunice also suffered numerous mini-stroke episodes. Despite her deteriorating condition, Eunice’s doctor stated that she was still capable of managing her own self-care; could carry on a conversation; recognize familiar faces;
find her way home; and remember her name, where she lived, and the date.
Eunice suffered a significant stroke in 2011. Eunice began living with Martin in 2012. Eunice was ultimately transferred to a nursing home in 2014. At that time, she signed a survivorship agreement naming herself, Martin, and his wife as joint tenants to her property with the right of survivorship. Martin signed the survivorship agreement on Eunice’s behalf as her attorney-in-fact.
Eunice died in December 2016. The circuit court entered an order in January 2017 probating Eunice’s 2010 will and appointing Martin as executor. Lloyd Jr.
and Derrell contested the will in February 2017 and alleged that Eunice was unduly influenced by Martin and lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will.
The circuit court invalidated Eunice’s will. The court concluded Eunice and Lloyd Sr. intended that their three sons would inherit the family land and home equally as provided in the 2006 will. The court further held that Martin secured a sole interest in the property by violating a confidential duty owed to Eunice.
Martin appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals.
RITA W. GRUBER, CHIEF JUDGE “In a typical will contest, the burden of proving the invalidity of a will due to lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, or fraud is on the contestant.” Wiseman v. Keeter, 550 S.W.3d 883, 893 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018). If the proponent of the will procures the making of the will, however, “a presumption of undue influence arises, and the burden shifts to the proponent to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the testator had testamentary capacity and was free from undue influence in executing the will.” Id. at 894-95. A rebuttable presumption also arises if a confidential relationship exists between the testator and primary beneficiary, and in that instance, the proponent of the will must prove the testator’s mental capacity and free will by a preponderance of the evidence.
In this case, Martin agrees that he and his mother were in a confidential relationship as a result of the power of attorney; therefore, a rebuttable presumption of undue influence was warranted. He asserts, however, that he rebutted the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. We disagree.
In Robinson v. Estate of Robinson, 485 S.W.3d 261 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016), this court explained the correlation between evidence of mental capacity and evidence of undue influence. There, we reiterated that [t]he questions of mental competency and undue influence are so closely related and interwoven that [this court] considers them together. In a case where the mind of the testator is strong and alert, the facts constituting undue influence would be required to be far stronger than a case in which the mind of the testator is impaired, such as by disease or advancing age. Testamentary capacity means that the testator must be able to retain his mind, without prompting, the extent and condition of his property, to comprehend to whom he is giving it, and relations of those entitled to his bounty. The relevant inquiry is not the mental capacity of the testator before or after the challenged will is signed, but rather the level of capacity at the time the will was signed. Undue influence is defined as “not the legitimate influence which springs from natural affection, but the malign influence which results from fear, coercion, or any other cause that deprives the testator of his free agency in the disposition of his property.” Undue influence may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, and cases involving questions of undue influence will frequently depend on a determination of witness credibility.
485 S.W.3d at 265.
The evidence at trial demonstrated that Eunice had already begun to experience some cognitive decline in 2010. While her medical records indicate that she was still capable of managing her own self-care and could “converse in a meaningful manner; recognize familiar faces; find her way home; remember her name;
remember where she lives; [and] remember the date,” there was other evidence, particularly from Lloyd Jr. and Derrell, demonstrating that she had begun having paranoid hallucinations. While Martin introduced witness testimony that Eunice generally did not appear coerced or intimidated, none of those witnesses addressed the execution of the will or, for that matter, were present when it was executed. Accordingly, because we defer to the circuit court’s superior position on matters of credibility, and Martin otherwise failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence, we affirm.
The circuit court did not clearly err when it determined that Martin failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence that arose with respect to the will admitted into probate. Accordingly, we affirm its ruling setting aside the will.
CRITICAL THINKING:
What were the critical factors identified by the court with respect to undue influence in this case?
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING:
How far should courts go to protect the elderly and infirm from undue influence?