Cruz’s parents purchased a pressure cooker from a vendor at the San Diego County Fair [in California] in the summer of 2001.

On September 10, 2001, Cruz, who was 16 years old at the time, suffered burns on the left side of his torso and thigh when he attempted to take the lid off of the pressure cooker. Fagor [America, Inc.] is the American distributor of the pressure cooker.

On the date of the incident involving the pressure cooker, Cruz’s parents sent an e-mail to Fagor to alert the company about what had occurred.

On June 2, 2003, [Fagor] notifi ed Cruz that it was denying liability.

* * * *

Cruz fi led a complaint [in a California state court] against Fagor on December 1, 2004, alleging causes of action for negligence and product liability. On December 14, 2004, Cruz, through his attorney, mailed the summons and complaint to Fagor by certifi ed mail, return receipt requested. The envelope was addressed to “Patricio Barriga, Chairman of the Board, FAGOR AMERICA, INC., A Delaware Corporation, 1099 Wall Street, Lyndhurst, NJ 07071-3678.”

The return receipt indicates that it was signed by an individual named Tina Hayes on December 22. Fagor did not fi le an answer.

* * * *

A default judgment [a judgment entered against a defendant who fails to answer or respond to the plaintiff’s complaint] in the amount of $259,114.50 was entered against Fagor on May 31, 2005.

Fagor did not make an appearance in the matter until November 29, 2005, when Fagor’s attorneys

* * * [fi led] a motion to set aside the entry of default and default judgment.

* * * *

* * * On February 1, the trial court granted the motion. Cruz

[appealed to a state intermediate appellate court] on February 16.

* * * *

* * * The trial court found that service was not effected because there was no proof that the summons and complaint (1) were served on Fagor’s designated agent for service;

(2) were delivered to the president or other offi cer, manager, or person authorized to receive service in accordance with [California Civil Procedure Code Section] 416.10; or

(3) were served in accordance with

[California] Corporations Code Section 2110, which provides for service on a foreign corporation by hand delivery to an offi cer or designated agent for service of process.

* * * [But] the proofs of service demonstrate that Cruz served Fagor, an out-of-state corporation, in accordance with [California Civil Procedure Code Section] 415.40. Section 415.40 provides in pertinent part:

A summons may be served on a person outside this state in any manner provided by this article or by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served by fi rst-class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt.

Because Fagor is a corporate entity, Cruz was also required to comply with the mandates of Section 416.10. That section details how a plaintiff is to serve a summons on a corporate defendant and provides in relevant part:

A summons may be served on a corporation by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint: * * * To the president or other head of the corporation, a vice president, a secretary or assistant secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a general manager, or a person authorized by the corporation to receive service of process.

* * * *

A number of documents in the record establish that Cruz properly served Fagor with process pursuant to California’s statutory requirements. The fi rst is a Judicial Counsel of California proof of service form, completed and signed by Cruz’s attorney, Harold Thompson. In that form, Thompson states that the summons and complaint were addressed and mailed to Patricio Barriga, the president of Fagor, at 1099 Wall Street, Lyndhurst, New Jersey 07071-3678, which is the address Fagor listed in 2003 with the New York State Department of State—Division of Corporations as its “service of process address.”

* * * Thompson’s declaration was properly executed because it shows that Cruz addressed the summons and complaint to a person to be served, as listed under Section 416.10. [Emphasis added.]

Cruz also submitted a signed return receipt to establish the fact of actual delivery. A return receipt attached to the proof of service form shows that the envelope was accepted at the Lyndhurst address. The receipt was signed by Hayes.

* * * *

* * * Cruz submitted the declaration of his attorney, Harold Thompson, in which Thompson states that he confi rmed with a representative of the United States Postal Service in Lyndhurst, New Jersey, that Hayes regularly receives mail on behalf of Fagor at its Lyndhurst offi ce. This is * * *

suffi cient to establish that an agent authorized to receive mail on the defendant’s behalf received the summons and complaint.

* * * *

* * * By virtue of her authority to accept mail on Fagor’s behalf, Hayes’s notice of the action is imputed to Fagor and its offi cers. Barriga’s statement that he did not receive the summons and complaint does not establish that service of process was invalid. Barriga had constructive knowledge of the existence of the action, and of the summons and complaint, once an individual authorized to receive corporate mail acknowledged service. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the realities of corporate life, in which the duty to sign for mail received often resides with a designated mailroom employee, a receptionist, a secretary, or an assistant. A plaintiff who has provided evidence that a person authorized to receive mail on behalf of a corporation in fact received an item that was mailed to an offi cer of the corporation should not be held responsible for any failure on the part of the corporate defendant to effectively distribute that mail. [Emphasis added.]

* * * Cruz has * * * satisfi ed all of the elements necessary to establish effective service.

* * * *

The order of the trial court is reversed.

Questions:-

1. Suppose that Cruz had misaddressed the envelope but the summons had still reached Hayes, and Cruz could prove it. Would this have been suffi cient to establish valid service? Explain.

2. Should a plaintiff be required to serve a defendant with a summons and a copy of a complaint more than once?
Why or why not?