The regulatory apparatus of our government depends on ethical behavior on the part of corporations.

It depends on corporations to generate accurate data for agencies such as the FDA, the FAA, and the EPA to use in analyzing safety risks. The government’s resources are limited; it cannot perform all the necessary tests itself, but must rely on companies to do their own tests, and to share all relevant results—particularly when those results point to safety problems. Business decisions to hold back adverse information from regulators can be both fatal and expensive. Consider the Bridgestone/Ford debacle of 2000. In the 1970s, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

(NHTSA) collected safety data directly from a network of repair shops, but after the budget cuts of the 1980s, this agency began relying on data generated by industry. NHTSA also made reports of foreign car recalls voluntary. In 1999, both Bridgestone and Ford knew the Wilderness tire/Ford Explorer combo was dangerous; there had been dozens of tread separations and SUV rollover deaths abroad, particularly in hot climates. The two companies planned a recall in Saudi Arabia but then made a joint decision not to alert NHTSA, fearing this would lead to a recall in the United States. By late 2000, after SUV rollovers caused more than 100 fatalities in the United States, Bridgestone was forced to recall more than 6 million tires, and both companies faced countless lawsuits.

The dissent in Pierce mentions the need to protect “professional autonomy.” What does this phrase mean? What connection might professional autonomy have with the U.S. safety regulatory scheme?