One year ago, University Hospital and nearby Women's Hospital merged. As part of the merger, University Hospital eliminated its small maternity service, and Women's Hospital eliminated most of its internal laboratory. The two hospitals are both owned by one parent organization, yet they remain distinct profit centers, with an "each tub on its own bottom" philosophy.
A problem recently arose when Women's Hospital demanded a price reduction for the laboratory work associated with an amniocentesis. This procedure is performed at Women's on a regular basis, but after the merger, the laboratory work for it has been performed at University.
However, Women's had recently found that an independent laboratory would do the work for $250, as compared with the $300 University was charging. Although the total dollars involved were not substantial (Women's only had about 300 amniocenteses per year), all agreed that an important policy issue was involved and that resolution should be sought.
A joint oversight committee of the two hospitals found that the direct incremental costs of performing the amniocenteses were $200 in labor and supplies. In addition.
University was charging $60 for overhead that would be incurred whether or not the amniocentesis laboratory tests were done at University, and $40 for profit. It was also found that Women's was currently making a $70 profit on the entire procedure but could raise that profit by $50 if it could get the laboratory work done for $50 less.
How much would the transfer price be under • full charges, • variable costs, • market price, and • negotiated price?
How much profit does each hospital make under each alternative? How much do the combined hospitals make under each of the above alternatives? What would happen if Women's purchased from an outside laboratory for $250?