The undisputed facts are that James Helton, a sixteen-yearold white male also known as G–Dog, is a member of the Imperial Gangster Disciples (IGD), a twelve member youth group. In October 1991, while Helton was second in command or the number two G, he and other members initiated Scott Bullington into IGD. IGD members perform the initiation ritual, called “a 46,” by striking the initiate forty times in the head and six times in the chest while standing in a circle around an ironing board with a blue bandanna, a candle, and a handgun placed on top.

In February 1992, twelve to fourteen IGD members met to initiate Travis Hammons. Helton and two other IGD members initiated Hammons after number one G Charlie Moran recited the traditional initiation “prayer.” While four IGD members restrained Hammons, Helton delivered 20 barefisted, hard blows directly to Hammons’ head . . . Hammons knew of the initiation rite and consented to “a 46” by Helton and other members in order to become IGD members themselves.

On April 23, 1992, the Morgan County court waived juvenile jurisdiction over then fifteen-year-old Helton, to the Morgan Superior Court . . . Helton waived his right to a jury trial, and on January 21, 1993, the trial court determined the Gang Statute was constitutional and found Helton guilty of criminal gang activity. The trial court sentenced Helton to three years imprisonment, suspended so long as he complied with the terms of his probation. Helton now appeals.

Helton [argues] that an intra-gang beating is not a battery relies upon the general rule that consent is a defense to the offense of battery. However, our supreme court recently recognized exceptions to the general rule. Jaske v. State (1989), Ind., 539 N.E.2d 14, 18. Consent is not a defense to the charge of battery in these limited circumstances: (1) Where the defendant goes beyond acts consented to and beats to death the victim who consented only to the defendant’s execution of the organization’s initiation ritual of being struck in the stomach until he passed out; (2) Where it is against public policy to permit the conduct or resulting harm even though it is consented to, as where there are no sexual overtones and the battery is a severe one which involves a breach of the public peace, as well as, an invasion of the victim’s physical security; (3) Where consent is ineffective as where it is obtained by fraud or from one lacking legal capacity to consent; (4) Where a deadly weapon is employed; (5) Where death results; or, (6)
Where the battery is atrocious or aggravated.

Questions:

1. When is physical contact with another person covered by the consent defense in Illinois?
2. Why should the defendant be convicted of a crime when the victim consented to the beating?