1. Do procedures exist for the executive branch to intervene in a railway labor dispute and interrupt any self-help measures that may be disrupting essential transportation services?
2. Does the Supreme Court have the power to enjoin secondary activity by rail unions?

[The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE) expanded its strike against the Maine Central Railroad to other rail carriers that had no connection and were not substantially aligned with the struck railroad. A federal district court in Illinois issued a preliminary injunction against the union’s picketing of any railroad other than those involved in the primary dispute. The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that under the Norris- LaGuardia Act (the Federal Anti-Injunction Act), a federal court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a federal court has jurisdiction to issue such an injunction.]

Brennan, J.…

[A]s this case illustrates, § 10 of the RLA provides a ready mechanism for the Executive Branch to intervene and interrupt any self-help measures by invoking an Emergency Board and thereby imposing at a minimum a 60-day cooling-off period. If the Board’s recommendations are not initially accepted by the parties, Congress has the power to enforce the Board’s recommendation by statute, as it has done here. Allowing secondary picketing in the self-help period is thus not inconsistent with the structure or purpose of the Act, and may in fact increase the likelihood of settlement prior to selfhelp. This is therefore not a case in which “the scheme of the Railway Labor Act could not begin to work without judicial involvement.” Chicago & North Western, supra. 402 U.S. at 595 (Brennan J., dissenting).

While opinions regarding the RLA’s success in meeting its goals have varied over time, it does appear that under the RLA labor and management have been able to resolve most conflicts without resort to secondary picketing. We decline, at this advanced stage of the RLA’s development, to find in it an implied limit on a union’s resort to secondary activity. Instead, “if Congress should now find that abuses in the nature of secondary activities have arisen in the railroad industry … it is for the Congress, and not the Courts, to strike the balance ‘between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective interests.’” Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S., at 392….

… In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes. Congress has not seen fit to restore that power. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.