1. State the issue before the court.

2. Why did the Hallimans bring an action for damages in a court of law when Halliman was clearly entitled to benefits under the workers’ compensation law?
3. When an employee is injured as a result of an employer’s deliberate failure to provide a safe workplace, may the employee sue the employer for damages in a court of law?
4. Is there an exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers’ compensation laws for intentional acts of agents or “coemployees”?

[Robert Halliman was employed as a teacher by the Los Angeles Unified School District at Milliken Junior High School. On November 4, 1982, a minor student, Louis "R," intentionally threw a rock at him, hitting him on the head and seriously injuring him. The same student had committed previous assaults on the school grounds, including an assault earlier that very day. Halliman and his wife brought suit against the Los Angeles Unified School District and the student's parents, seeking damages. Halliman contended that the defendants had the power and ability to prevent the student's conduct by appropriate disciplinary action but did not do so, ignoring their duty to protect students and teachers. The school district filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the workers' compensation act provided the exclusive remedy for Halliman's injury. From a summary judgment in favor of the school district, Halliman appealed.]
ARGVELLES, A. J.…
In this appeal from a judgment favoring a school district, we are called upon to determine whether workers'
compensation is the exclusive remedy for a teacher's injuries caused by a student's unprovoked assault while the teacher is acting within the scope of his employment….
We find … that plaintiffs have failed to state facts negating application of the exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation laws in their complaint….

We disagree with plaintiffs' contention that Meyer v. Graphic Arts International Union (1979) 88 Cal. App. 3d 176,151 Cal. Rptr. 597, is dispositive of the issue in their favor. Meyer involved injury by a coemployee of plaintiff, and there had been reported prior acts of aggression by that person against the complaining employee followed by the employer's ratification or acquiescence in failing to discipline, censure, criticize, suspend or discharge the offending coemployee. Here, as defendant correctly points out, the assailant was not a coemployee but a student for whom the plaintiff teacher, among other employees at the school, was responsible. The record before us discloses no reports of prior assaults upon plaintiff teacher by the same student. Additionally, the student's school records indicated that he had, indeed, been previously suspended and otherwise disciplined for prior assaults.

In Adler v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3d 280, 288, 159 Cal. Rptr. 528, though the case was decided on other grounds, the court presumed that where a teacher was injured in a classroom attack by a student, the available workers' compensation remedy barred a civil lawsuit for damages against the employer by virtue of Labor Code section 3601. Under the facts of this case, we so hold.
Plaintiffs argue that a student in this context is akin to an employer's agent or a coemployee who is "under the control" of the employer; and, therefore, the school district "employer" comes within the statutory exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation laws for intentional acts of agents and coemployees. But, teacher and student are not equals, standing shoulder to shoulder in the classroom or on the playground, with the same status, rights, duties, responsibilities, maturity, judgment, knowledge and skill. If an analogy is to be drawn, a more appropriate one would liken the student to raw material which must be wrought by the employee into a finished product.

Thus, we find it helpful in addressing plaintiff's contentions to refer to those cases where the alleged intentional misconduct of the employer does not go beyond failure to assure a safe working environment. The California Supreme Court in Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 465, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 612 P.2d 948, reviewed cases where the employer concealed inherent dangers in the material its employees were required to handle, or made false representations in that regard, or allowed an employee to use a machine without proper instruction. Workers' compensation was held to be the exclusive remedy for any injuries thus suffered. The Supreme Court concluded that the workers' compensation laws provided "the sole remedy for additional compensation against an employer whose employee is injured in the first instance as the result of a deliberate failure to assure that the physical environment of the workplace is safe."
The facts of the present case do not justify a departure from such precedent.
[Judgment affirmed.]