1. Was the reassignment of Sheila White from forklift operator duties to track laborer duties unlawful gender discrimination and retaliation for her complaint about her treatment by the first foreman?
2. Can a rescinded disciplinary suspension with full back pay be considered a materially adverse employer action in violation of Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation?

[Sheila White was hired by the BNSF Railway as a track laborer at the Carrier's Tennessee Yard. She was the only woman in the track department. When hired, she was given the job of forklift operator, as opposed to the ordinary track laborer tasks. Three months after being hired, she complained to the road-master that her foreman treated her differently than he treated male employees and twice made inappropriate remarks. The foreman was suspended without pay for 10 days and ordered to attend sexual harassment training. Also at that time, the roadmaster reassigned the forklift duties to the former operator, who was "senior" to White, and assigned White to track labor duties. Six months into her employment, White refused to ride in a truck as directed by a different foreman, and she was suspended for insubordination. Some 37 days later, she was reinstated with full back pay, and the discipline was removed from her record. She filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming that the reassignment to track laborer duties was unlawful gender discrimination and retaliation for her complaint about her treatment by the foreman. The 37-day suspension led to a second retaliation charge. A jury rejected her gender discrimination claim and awarded her compensatory damages for her retaliation claims. BNSF appealed, contending that Ms. White was hired as a track laborer and it was not retaliatory to assign her to do the work she was hired to do. It also asserted that the suspension of 37 days was corrected, and she was made whole for her loss.]
BREYER, J….
To be sure, reassignment of job duties is not automatically actionable. Whether a particular reassignment is materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and "should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances.'" Oncale, 523 U.S., at 81, 118 S.Ct. 998. But here, the jury had before it considerable evidence that the track labor duties were "by all accounts more arduous and dirtier"; that the "forklift operator position required more qualifications, which is an indication of prestige"; and that "the forklift operator position was objectively considered a better job and the male employees resented White for occupying it." 364 F.3d, at 803 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on this record, a jury could reasonably conclude that the reassignment of responsibilities would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.
Second, Burlington argues that the 37-day suspension without pay lacked statutory significance because Burlington ultimately reinstated White with backpay. Burlington says that "it defies reason to believe that Congress would have considered a rescinded investigatory suspension with full back pay" to be unlawful….
… White did receive backpay. But White and her family had to live for 37 days without income. They did not know during that time whether or when White could return to work. Many reasonable employees would find a month without a paycheck to be a serious hardship. And White described to the jury the physical and emotional hardship that 37 days of having "no income, no money" in fact caused. 1 Tr. 154 ("That was the worst Christmas I had out of my life. No income, no money, and that made all of us feel bad…. I got very depressed").
Indeed, she obtained medical treatment for her emotional distress. A reasonable employee facing the choice between retaining her job (and paycheck) and filing a discrimination complaint might well choose the former. That is to say, an indefinite suspension without pay could well act as a deterrent, even if the suspended employee eventually received backpay. Cf. Mitchell, 361 U.S., at 292, 80 S.Ct, 332 ("[I]t needs no argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions"). Thus, the jury's conclusion that the 37-day suspension without pay was materially adverse was a reasonable one.
[Affirmed]

It is so ordered.