1. What is a mixed-motive case? Give an example from the text.
2. What remedy options exist in a mixed-motive case in which the jury determines that the employer demonstrated that it would have taken the same employment action of termination in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor?

[Petitioner Desert Palace, Inc., dba Caesar's Palace Hotel & Casino of Las Vegas, Nevada, employed respondent Catharina Costa as a warehouse worker and heavy equipment operator. She was the only woman in this job and in her local Teamsters' bargaining unit. Costa experienced a number of problems with management and her coworkers that led to an escalating series of disciplinary sanctions, including informal rebukes, a denial of privileges, and suspension. The employer finally terminated her after she was involved in a physical altercation in a warehouse elevator with fellow Teamsters' member Herbert Gerber. The employer disciplined both employees because the facts surrounding the incident were in dispute, but Gerber, who had a clean disciplinary record, was assessed a five-day suspension while Costa was fired. Ms. Costa subsequently filed this lawsuit against her employer, in the United States district court, for sex discrimination. At trial, she presented evidence that (1) she was singled out for "intense stalking" by one of her supervisors, (2) she received harsher discipline than men for the same conduct, (3) she was treated less favorably than men in the assignment of overtime, and (4) supervisors repeatedly "stacked" her disciplinary record and "frequently used or tolerated" sex-based slurs against her. The district court instructed the jury that "[t]he plaintiff has the burden of proving … by a preponderance of the evidence" that she "suffered adverse work conditions" and that her sex "was a motivating factor in any such work conditions imposed upon her." The district court gave the jury the following mixed-motive instruction:

You have heard evidence that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by the plaintiff's sex and also by other lawful reasons. If you find that the plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the defendant's conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason.

However, if you find that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by both gender and lawful reasons, you must decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff similarly even if the plaintiff's gender had played no role in the employment decision.

The employer unsuccessfully objected to this instruction, claiming that Costa had failed to adduce
"direct evidence" that sex was a motivating factor in her dismissal. The jury rendered a verdict for Costa, awarding back pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.

The Court of Appeals, en banc, concluded that a "plaintiff … may establish a violation through a preponderance of evidence (whether direct or circumstantial) that a protected characteristic played "a motivating factor." Based on that standard, the court of appeals held that respondent's evidence was sufficient to warrant a mixed-motive instruction and that a reasonable jury could have found that respondent's sex was a "motivating factor in her treatment." The Supreme Court granted certiorari.]

THOMAS, J….
… This case provides us with the first opportunity to consider the effects of the 1991 Act on jury instructions in mixed-motive cases. Specifically, we must decide whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)….

Our precedents make clear that the starting point for our analysis is the statutory text. And where, as here, the words of the statute are unambiguous, the "'judicial inquiry is complete.'" Section 2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only
"demonstrat[e]" that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to "any employment practice." On its face, the statute does not mention, much less require, that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct evidence….

Moreover, Congress explicitly defined the term "demonstrates" in the 1991 Act, leaving little doubt that no special evidentiary showing is required. Title VII defines the term "'demonstrates'" as to "mee[t] the burdens of production and persuasion." § 2000e(m)….

In addition, Title VII's silence with respect to the type of evidence required in mixed-motive cases also suggests that we should not depart from the "[c]onventional rul[e] of civil litigation [that] generally appl[ies] in Title VII cases." That rule requires a plaintiff to prove his case "by a preponderance of the evidence," using "direct or circumstantial evidence," Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714, n. 3 (1983). We have often acknowledged the utility of circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases. For instance, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), we recognized that evidence that a defendant's explanation for an employment practice is "unworthy of credence" is "one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination." Id., at 147 (emphasis added). The reason for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep rooted: "Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence." Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508, n. 17.…
In order to obtain an instruction under § 2000e 2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "race, color, religion, sex, and national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice." Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixedmotive instruction to the jury. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.