1. What is the employer’s view as to the origin of “explicit,” “well-defined,” and “dominant” public policy that makes the agreement to reinstate Smith contrary to public policy?
2. Did the Supreme Court accept the employer’s position? Explain.

[A labor arbitrator returned a heavy truck operator, James Smith, to service with specific stringent conditions after the operator had failed a second random drug test within a 15-month interval by testing positive for marijuana use. The employer sought to have the arbitrator's award vacated in federal court on the basis that the award contravened the public policy against the operation of dangerous machinery by workers who test positive for drugs. The federal district court, while recognizing a strong regulationbased public policy against drug use by workers who perform safety-sensitive functions, held that the employee's conditional reinstatement did not violate that policy and ordered the enforcement of the arbitration award. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.]
BREYER, J.…
We agree, in principle, that courts' authority to invoke the public policy exception is not limited solely to instances where the arbitration award itself violates positive law. Nevertheless, the public policy exception is narrow and must satisfy the principles set forth in W.R. Grace and Misco. Moreover, in a case like the one before us, where two political branches have created a detailed regulatory regime in a specific field, courts should approach with particular caution pleas to divine further public policy in that area.…
Regarding drug use by persons in safety-sensitive positions, then, Congress has enacted a detailed statute. And Congress has delegated to the Secretary of Transportation authority to issue further detailed regulations on that subject. Upon careful consideration, including public notice and comment, the Secretary has done so. Neither Congress nor the Secretary has seen fit to mandate the discharge of a worker who twice tests positive for drugs. We hesitate to infer a public policy in this area that goes beyond the careful and detailed scheme Congress and the Secretary have created.
We recognize that reasonable people can differ as to whether reinstatement or discharge is the more appropriate remedy here. But both employer and union have agreed to entrust this remedial decision to an arbitrator. We cannot find in the Act, the regulations, or any other law or legal precedent an
"explicit," "well defined," "dominant" public policy to which the arbitrator's decision "runs contrary,"
Misco, 484 U.S., at 43; and W. R. Grace, 461 U.S., at 766. We conclude that the lower courts correctly rejected Eastern's public policy claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
[The concurring opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, criticizes the majority's statement that "[w]e agree, in principle, that courts' authority to invoke the public policy exception is not limited solely to instances where the arbitrator's award itself violates positive law." Justice Scalia complained that this dictum opens the door to "fluid public policy arguments of the sort presented by the petitioner, [Eastern Coal]." Justice Scalia believes that it is hard to imagine how an arbitration award could violate public policy as identified in W. R. Grace, Misco, and Eastern Coal without actually conflicting with positive law. In sum, he believes that dictum "is not worth the candle."]