Clara Watson, who is black, was hired by the Fort Worth Bank and Trust Company in August 1973 and was promoted to teller in 1976. Between 1980 and 1981, Watson applied for four supervisory jobs, but white employees were selected for these positions. The bank, which had some 80 employees, had not developed formal criteria for evaluating candidates, but relied on the subjective judgment of supervisors who were acquainted with the candidates and the nature of the jobs to be filled.

In a Title VII lawsuit against the bank, the trial court, following a disparate treatment model, concluded that Watson had established a prima facie case; the bank had rebutted it by presenting legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for each challenged promotion decision; and Watson had failed to show that the reasons were pretexts. Watson presented evidence showing that the bank had only one black supervisor from 1975 to 1983, and a statistician testified on her behalf that a white applicant had a four times better chance of being hired than a black applicant. Watson claimed that a disparate impact model analysis of the employer's subjective promotion policy standards indicated that she was discriminated against in violation of Title VII. The court refused to apply a disparate impact analysis to subjective promotion procedures such as job interviews and performance evaluations, saying that disparate impact analysis was meant to evaluate such objective criteria as testing or diploma requirements.

Watson contended that if an employer's undisciplined system of subjective decision making had precisely the same effect as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination, it was difficult to see why Title VII was not violated. She contended, moreover, that the Griggs decision would be nullified if disparate impact analysis were applied only to objective selection practices.

The bank contended that employers would have to abandon subjective methods of evaluating candidates for promotion, such as interviews or performance evaluations, if it were forced to defend disparate impact cases, and its only alternative would be to adopt a quota system to ensure that no plaintiff could establish a prima facie case. It stated that quota systems were clearly contrary to Title VII. Further, the bank stated that Watson had full opportunity to prove that the bank did not promote her because of her race, and she failed to prove her case.

Did the trial court err in failing to apply disparate impact analysis to Watson's claims of discrimination in promotion? Decide.
[Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust Co., 47 FEP 102 (U.S. Sup. Ct.)]