Anthony Ireland was convicted for four counts of forcible rape in Superior Court, Fresno County. The California Court of Appeals affirmed.

. . . Each of appellant’s four convictions of forcible rape involved a different victim but a similar scenario.

Count 1: V.B. In late October of 2007, V.B. was working as a prostitute on Motel Drive when appellant, in a fourdoor burgundy car, approached and asked her for a

“date,” which she described as an agreement to have sex for an agreed-upon amount of money. The two agreed on a price of $40 . . . They parked in a driveway near railroad tracks.

Appellant told V.B. to get into the back seat of the car, which she did. When appellant entered the back seat, V.B. felt a metal knife against her neck. V.B. began to cry and begged appellant “please don’t hurt me.” V.B. testified she was afraid and did not want to die. Appellant told her to be quiet and that he would not hurt her if she cooperated. V.B. was afraid that, if she resisted, appellant would cut or stab her.

Appellant then had vaginal intercourse with V.B., while holding the knife to her throat. V.B. described the knife as a big butcher knife with a seven- to nine-inch blade and a wooden handle . . . V.B. had never met appellant prior to the incident.

She did not consent to the sexual act as it happened, and she did not agree to the use of the knife when she got into the car. V.B. did not report the incident to the police at first, because she was a prostitute . . .

[Victim 2, J.W., Victim 3, A.H., and Victim 4, C.S., who was only 15 years old, had sexual intercourse under similar factual circumstances as the first count].
. . . Lack of consent is an element of the crime of rape.
Consent is defined in section 261.6 as “positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved.”
CALCRIM No. 1000, as given here, instructed that “[t]o consent, a woman must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.”
“Actual consent must be distinguished from submission.
[A] victim’s decision to submit to an attacker’s sexual demands out of fear of bodily injury is not consent because the decision is not freely and voluntarily made (§ 261.6). A selection by the victim of the lesser of two evils—rape versus the violence threatened by the attacker if the victim resists—is hardly an exercise of free will.” (People v. Giardino (2000) 82 Cal. App. 4th 454, 460, fn. 3).
Where the woman’s lack of consent was uncommunicated and could not reasonably be detected, however, the accused may not be guilty of rape. It is a defense that the accused reasonably and in good faith believed the woman engaged in the act consensually.
. . . Appellant’s argument is that each victim gave her consent to the sex act that was committed, that his use of the knife during the act did not automatically negate that consent, and that there was insufficient evidence that any of the victims communicated a withdrawal of consent to him.
Respondent [State of California], on the other hand, contends the determinative question is not whether the victims communicated a withdrawal of consent. Instead, according to respondent, appellant’s use of the knife, along with his express or implied threat to harm his victims if they did not cooperate, did automatically negate their previously given consent.
We agree with respondent’s analysis. There is no doubt that, at the beginning of each encounter, each victim freely consented to intercourse. But as to each of the victims, appellant communicated the express or implied threat that, if they did not continue to cooperate even after he produced the knife and held it to their throats, he would do them harm.
As to the victim V.B., the testimony was that appellant told her “just to cooperate” and she “won’t get hurt.” When the victim J.W. asked appellant what he was doing with the knife, he told her to “‘shut up.’” She did, because she was afraid he would otherwise “slice [her] neck off.” He told her not to scream or make any sudden movements and he would not use the knife. When the victim A.H. reacted to appellant putting the knife to her throat by saying “no,” appellant responded by instructing her to put a condom on his penis, remove her pants, and get on her knees. She complied because she thought he would otherwise kill her. To the victim C.S., appellant said “do what I say and you won’t get hurt.” She cooperated out of fear.
. . . The essence of consent is that it is given out of free will.
That is why it can be withdrawn. While there exists a defense to rape based on the defendant’s actual and reasonable belief that the victim does consent, we do not require that victims communicate their lack of consent. We certainly do not require that victims resist. Yet this is what appellant proposes here. At the time of the offenses, appellant told his victims to cooperate or be hurt. Now he contends they were required to express to him their lack of cooperation.
That cannot be the law. When appellant used the knife and expressly or impliedly threatened his victims, and in the absence of any conduct by the victims indicating that they continued to consent, the previously given consent no longer existed, either in fact or in law . . . From all of this evidence, it is clear that these victims did not continue to consent when appellant put the knife to their throats and that appellant knew they did not continue to consent. Thus, if they were required to communicate a withdrawal of consent, they adequately did so.
Substantial evidence supports each of the convictions of forcible rape, and we reject appellant’s claim to the contrary.

Questions:-

1. The court acknowledges that all four victims initially consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant. Did they effectively withdraw their consent? Why or why not?
2. Should rape laws have a different standard for prostitutes? Why or why not?
3. The defendant was sentenced to 100 years in prison. Is that an appropriate sentence for his crime?