Appellant/defendant the Hyatt Corporation appeals the lower court’s Summary Final Judgment in favor of appellee/ plaintiff Palm Beach National Bank. * * * We affirm.

   J&D Financial Corporation is a factoring company. Skyscraper Building Maintenance, LLC, had a contract with Hyatt to perform maintenance work for various Hyatt hotels in South Florida. Skyscraper entered into a factoring agreement with J&D. As part of the factoring agreement, J&D requested Hyatt to make checks payable for maintenance services to Skyscraper and J&D. Of the many checks issued by Hyatt to Skyscraper and J&D, two were negotiated by the bank but indorsed only by Skyscraper. They were made payable as follows:

1. Check No. 1-78671 for $22,531 payable to:

J&D Financial Corp.
Skyscraper Building Maint
P.O. Box 610250
North Miami, Florida 33261-0250

2. Check No. 1-75723 for $21,107 payable to:

Skyscraper Building Maint
J&D Financial Corp.
P.O. Box 610250
North Miami, Florida 33261-0250

   Only one of the payees, Skyscraper, indorsed these two checks. The bank cashed the checks. According to J&D, it did not receive the benefit of these two payments.

   J&D filed a complaint against Skyscraper and its principals on the guarantee, Hyatt and the bank. J&D sought damages against Skyscraper under the factoring agreement and separately against Hyatt and the bank for negotiation of the two checks. Hyatt answered and raised the bank’s ‘‘fault’’ as an affirmative defense. * * * The bank, Hyatt and J&D then moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether the bank properly negotiated the checks. It was uncontested that the bank had a duty to negotiate the checks only on proper indorsement, and if it did not, it would be liable.

   The bank argued that the checks were payable to J&D and Skyscraper alternatively, and thus the bank could properly negotiate the checks based upon the indorsement of either of the two payees. The bank further argued that the checks were drafted ambiguously as to whether they were payable alternatively or jointly, and thus under [UCC] Section [3–110(d)], Florida Statutes, the checks would be construed as a matter of law to be payable alternatively.

   Hyatt’s position was that the checks were not ambiguous, were payable jointly and not alternatively, and thus under Section [3–110], the checks could only be negotiated by indorsement of both of the payees. J&D similarly argued that the checks were payable jointly. The trial court granted Summary Judgment in favor of the bank, finding that [UCC] Section [3–110(d)] precluded the bank’s liability. Hyatt appealed. J&D filed a cross-appeal.

The issue on appeal is whether or not a check payable to
J&D Financial Corporation
Skyscraper Building Maintenance

(stacked payees) is payable jointly to both payees requiring the indorsement of both, or whether it is ambiguous regarding whether the check was drafted payable alternatively, so that the bank could negotiate the check when it was indorsed by only one of the two payees.

   In 1990, Article 3 of the UCC was revised, and the language of UCC Section 3–116 was added to UCC section 3– 110 and became subsection (d). Revised UCC Section 3– 110(d), which added language to follow former 3–116(a) and (b), states, ‘‘If an instrument payable to two or more persons is ambiguous as to whether it is payable to the persons alternatively, the instrument is payable to the persons alternatively.’’ The net effect of the amendment was to change the presumption. What was unambiguous before is now ambiguous.

   Turning to our jurisdiction, Florida has adopted the statutory revision to UCC 3–110, * * *.

   The issue under review has not reached Florida’s appellate courts. However, two trial courts in Florida have addressed this issue in Bijlani v. Nationsbank of Florida, N.A., [citation] and City First Mortgage Corp. v. Florida Residential Property & Casualty Joint Underwriting Ass’n., [citation]. We find the reasoning in both cases to be persuasive.

   In Bijlani, the appellee paid a check which did not have Bijlani’s indorsement. The check was made payable to

Bay Village Inc.
Michael Bijlani & Ron Delo & Assoc
5411 Grenada Blvd
Coral Gables, FL 33133

   The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment, stating that ‘‘The multiple payee designation on the check is ambiguous as to whether it is payable to ‘Bay Village Inc.’ ‘‘Michael Bijlani * * * jointly or alternatively.’’ Holding that the bank was not liable, the trial court noted that the predecessor statute ‘‘provided that if an ambiguity existed as to whether multiple payees were intended as joint or alternative payees, they were deemed joint payees,’’ while the amended statute applicable to this case ‘‘reverses the prior rule.’’ [Citation.]

   In City First Mortgage Corp. [citation], a Florida County Court reached the same conclusion. In City First Mortgage Corp., the bank paid a check which did not have City First Mortgage Corp.’s indorsement. The check was made payable to

BORIS LA ROSA ODALYS LA ROSA
CITY FIRST MTG. CORP. ISAOA ATIMA

   The county court granted First Union’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint, stating that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action against the bank. The court found that,

On its face, the Check is payable to two or more persons and, as a matter of law, the payee designation on the Check is ambiguous as to whether it is payable to the persons alternatively. [Citations.]

   Although Florida appellate courts have not yet considered the issue at hand, other courts in the country have. [Citations.]

   For example, a case which has addressed this particular issue with almost identical facts to those before us is Allied Capital Partners, L.P. v. Bank One, Texas, N.A., [citation]. In Allied, the checks were made payable to:

Complete Design
Allied Capital Partners, LLP.
2340 E. Trinity Mills St. 300
Carrollton, Texas 75006

   The debtor indorsed the checks and deposited them into a corporate bank account. The factor then sued the bank for conversion for payment on the debtor’s indorsement.

   On appeal from the adverse summary judgment, the factor cited pre-revision law. The Texas appellate court affirmed the summary judgment, stating:

While it does appear that former Section 3–116 would have required the checks in this case to be payable to and negotiable only by all of the payees listed, this is no longer the case …

   [citation]. Under these facts, the court found that the check was unambiguous.

   We conclude that based on the 1990 amendment to the Uniform Commercial Code, when a check lists two payees without the use of the word ‘‘and’’ or ‘‘or’’, the nature of the payee is ambiguous as to whether they are alternative payees or joint payees. Therefore, the UCC amendment prevails and they are to be treated as alternative payees, thus requiring only one of the payees’ signatures. Consequently, the bank could negotiate the check when it was indorsed by only one of the two payees, thereby escaping liability.

***

   * * * Thus, we hold that the trial court was correct in granting the Summary Final Judgment.

   Affirmed.