In 2000, the city of New London approved a development plan that, in the words of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, was ‘‘projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas.’’ [Citation.] [The plan proposed to replace a faded residential neighborhood—Fort Trumbull—with office space for research and development, a conference hotel, new residences, and a pedestrian ‘‘riverwalk’’ along the Thames River. The project, to be built by private developers, is intended to build upon a $350 million research center built nearby by the Pfizer pharmaceutical company.

In assembling the land needed for this project, the city’s development agent has purchased property from willing sellers and proposes to use the power of eminent domain to acquire the remainder of the property from unwilling owners of fifteen properties in exchange for just compensation. The unwilling owners claimed that the taking of their properties would violate the ‘‘public use’’ restriction in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The trial court granted a permanent restraining order prohibiting the taking of some of the properties located in parcel. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that all of the City’s proposed takings were valid. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a city’s decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the ‘‘public use’’ requirement of the Fifth Amendment.]

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Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future ‘‘use by the public’’ is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example. Neither of these propositions, however, determines the disposition of this case.

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The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘‘public purpose.’’ Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.

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Those who govern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference. The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including— but by no means limited to—new jobs and increased tax revenue. As with other exercises in urban planning and development, the City is endeavoring to coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and recreational uses of land, with the hope that they will form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. To effectuate this plan, the City has invoked a state statute that specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote economic development. Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in [citation], to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.

To avoid this result, petitioners urge us to adopt a new bright-line rule that economic development does not qualify as a public use. Putting aside the unpersuasive suggestion that the City’s plan will provide only purely economic benefits, neither precedent nor logic supports petitioners’ proposal. Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government. There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes that we have recognized. * * *

Petitioners contend that using eminent domain for economic development impermissibly blurs the boundary between public and private takings. Again, our cases foreclose this objection. Quite simply, the government’s pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties. * * * Our rejection of that contention has particular relevance to the instant case: ‘‘The public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of government—or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.’’ [Citation.]

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Alternatively, petitioners maintain that for takings of this kind we should require a ‘‘reasonable certainty’’ that the expected public benefits will actually accrue. Such a rule, however, would represent an even greater departure from our precedent. ‘‘When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings— no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.’’ [Citation.] * * * A constitutional rule that required postponement of the judicial approval of every condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan had been assured would unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the successful consummation of many such plans.

Just as we decline to second-guess the City’s considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, we also decline to second-guess the City’s determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project. ‘‘It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.’’ [Citation.]

In affirming the City’s authority to take petitioners’ properties, we do not minimize the hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the payment of just compensation. We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose ‘‘public use’’ requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. * * *

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is affirmed.