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Kodak manufactures and sells complex business machines— as relevant here, high-volume photocopier and micrographics equipment. Kodak equipment is unique; micrographic software programs that operate on Kodak machines, for example, are not compatible with competitors’ machines. Kodak parts are not compatible with other manufacturers’ equipment, and vice versa. Kodak equipment, although expensive when new, has little resale value. 

   Kodak provides service and parts for its machines to its customers. It provides some of the parts itself; the rest are made to order for Kodak by independent original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Kodak does not sell a complete system of original equipment, lifetime service, and lifetime parts for a single price. Instead, Kodak provides service after the initial warranty period either through annual service contracts, which include all necessary parts, or on a per-call basis. It charges, through negotiations and bidding, different prices for equipment, service, and parts for different customers. Kodak provides 80% to 95% of the service for Kodak machines.

   Beginning in the early 1980s, ISOs [independent service organizations] began repairing and servicing Kodak equipment. They also sold parts and reconditioned and sold used Kodak equipment. Their customers were federal, state, and local government agencies, banks, insurance companies, industrial enterprises, and providers of specialized copy and microfilming services. ISOs provide service at a price substantially lower than Kodak does. Some customers found that the ISO service was of higher quality.

   Some of the ISOs’ customers purchase their own parts and hire ISOs only for service. Others choose ISOs to supply both service and parts. ISOs keep an inventory of parts, purchased from Kodak or other sources, primarily the OEMs.

   In 1985 and 1986, Kodak implemented a policy of selling replacement parts for micrographic and copying machines only to buyers of Kodak equipment who use Kodak service or repair their own machines.

   As part of the same policy, Kodak sought to limit ISO access to other sources of Kodak parts. Kodak and the OEMs agreed that the OEMs would not sell parts that fit Kodak equipment to anyone other than Kodak. Kodak also pressured Kodak equipment owners and independent parts distributors not to sell Kodak parts to ISOs. In addition, Kodak took steps to restrict the availability of used machines.

   Kodak intended, through these policies, to make it more difficult for ISOs to sell service for Kodak machines. It succeeded. ISOs were unable to obtain parts from reliable sources, and many were forced out of business, while others lost substantial revenue. Customers were forced to switch to Kodak service even though they preferred ISO service.

   In 1987, the [18] ISOs filed the present action in the District Court, alleging, inter alia, that Kodak had unlawfully tied the sale of service for Kodak machines to the sale of parts, in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act, and had unlawfully monopolized and attempted to monopolize the sale of service for Kodak machines, in violation of §2 of that Act.

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   A tying arrangement is ‘‘an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.’’ [Citation.] Such an arrangement violates §1 of the Sherman Act if the seller has ‘‘appreciable economic power’’ in the tying product market and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market. [Citation.]

   Kodak did not dispute that its arrangement affects a substantial volume of interstate commerce. It, however, did challenge whether its activities constituted a ‘‘tying arrangement’’ and whether Kodak exercised ‘‘appreciable economic power’’ in the tying market. We consider these issues in turn.

   For the respondents to defeat a motion for summary judgment on their claim of a tying arrangement, a reasonable trier of fact must be able to find, first, that service and parts are two distinct products, and, second, that Kodak has tied the sale of the two products.

   For service and parts to be considered two distinct products, there must be sufficient consumer demand so that it is efficient for a firm to provide service separately from parts. [Citation.] Evidence in the record indicates that service and parts have been sold separately in the past and still are sold Chapter 41 Antitrust 859 separately to self-service equipment owners. Indeed, the development of the entire high-technology service industry is evidence of the efficiency of a separate market for service.

   Kodak insists that because there is no demand for parts separate from service, there cannot be separate markets for service and parts. By that logic, we would be forced to conclude that there can never be separate markets, for example, for cameras and film, computers and software, or automobiles and tires. That is an assumption we are unwilling to make.

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   Having found sufficient evidence of a tying arrangement, we consider the other necessary feature of an illegal tying arrangement: appreciable economic power in the tying market. Market power is the power ‘‘to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market.’’ [Citation.] It has been defined as ‘‘the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output.’’ [Citations.] The existence of such power ordinarily is inferred from the seller’s possession of a predominant share of the market. [Citations.]

   Respondents contend that Kodak has more than sufficient power in the parts market to force unwanted purchases of the tied market, service. Respondents provide evidence that certain parts are available exclusively through Kodak. Respondents also assert that Kodak has control over the availability of parts it does not manufacture. According to respondents’ evidence, Kodak has prohibited independent manufacturers from selling Kodak parts to ISOs, pressured Kodak equipment owners and independent parts distributors to deny ISOs the purchase of Kodak parts, and taken steps to restrict the availability of used machines.

   Respondents also allege that Kodak’s control over the parts market has excluded service competition, boosted service prices, and forced unwilling consumption of Kodak service. Respondents offer evidence that consumers have switched to Kodak service even though they preferred ISO service, that Kodak service was of higher price and lower quality than the preferred ISO service, and that ISOs were driven out of business by Kodak’s policies. Under our prior precedents, this evidence would be sufficient to entitle respondents to a trial on their claim of market power.

   Kodak counters that even if it concedes monopoly share of the relevant parts market, it cannot actually exercise the necessary market power for a Sherman Act violation. This is so, according to Kodak, because competition exists in the equipment market. Kodak argues that it could not have the ability to raise prices of service and parts above the level that would be charged in a competitive market because any increase in profits from a higher price in the aftermarkets at least would be offset by a corresponding loss in profits from lower equipment sales as consumers began purchasing equipment with more attractive service costs.

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   The extent to which one market prevents exploitation of another market depends on the extent to which consumers will change their consumption of one product in response to a price change in another, i.e., the ‘‘crosselasticity of demand.’’ See du Pont, [citations]. Kodak’s proposed rule rests on a factual assumption about the cross-elasticity of demand in the equipment and aftermarkets: ‘‘If Kodak raised its parts or service prices above competitive levels, potential customers would simply stop buying Kodak equipment. Perhaps Kodak would be able to increase short term profits through such a strategy, but at a devastating cost to its long term interests.’’ Kodak argues that the Court should accept, as a matter of law, this ‘‘basic economic realit[y],’’ that competition in the equipment market necessarily prevents market power in the aftermarkets.

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   We conclude * * * that Kodak has failed to demonstrate that respondents’ inference of market power in the service and parts markets is unreasonable, and that, consequently, Kodak is entitled to summary judgment. It is clearly reasonable to infer that Kodak has market power to raise prices and drive out competition in the aftermarkets, since respondents offer direct evidence that Kodak did so. It is also plausible, as discussed above, to infer that Kodak chose to gain immediate profits by exerting that market power where locked-in customers, high information costs, and discriminatory pricing limited and perhaps eliminated any long-term loss. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to respondents, their allegations of market power ‘‘mak[e] * * * economic sense.’’ [Citation.]

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   We need not decide whether Kodak’s behavior has any procompetitive effects and, if so, whether they outweigh the anticompetitive effects. We note only that Kodak’s service and parts policy is simply not one that appears always or almost always to enhance competition, and therefore to warrant a legal presumption without any evidence of its actual economic impact. In this case, when we weigh the risk of deterring procompetitive behavior by proceeding to trial against the risk that illegal behavior go unpunished, the balance tips against summary judgment. [Citations.]

   * * * We therefore affirm the denial of summary judgment on respondents’ §1 claim.

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   Respondents also claim that they have presented genuine issues for trial as to whether Kodak has monopolized or attempted to monopolize the service and parts markets in violation of §2 of the Sherman Act. ‘‘The offense of monopoly under §2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’’ [Citation.]

   The existence of the first element, possession of monopoly power, is easily resolved. As has been noted, respondents have presented a triable claim that service and parts are separate markets, and that Kodak has the ‘‘power to control prices or exclude competition’’ in service and parts. du Pont, [citation]. Monopoly power under §2 requires, of course, something greater than market power under §1. [Citation.] Respondents’ evidence that Kodak controls nearly 100% of the parts market and 80% to 95% of the service market, with no readily available substitutes, is, however, sufficient to survive summary judgment under the more stringent monopoly standard of §2. [Citations.]

   Kodak also contends that, as a matter of law, a single brand of a product or service can never be a relevant market under the Sherman Act. We disagree. The relevant market for antitrust purposes is determined by the choices available to Kodak equipment owners. [Citation.] Because service and parts for Kodak equipment are not interchangeable with other manufacturers’ service and parts, the relevant market from the Kodak equipment owner’s perspective is composed of only those companies that service Kodak machines. See du Pont, [citation] (the ‘‘market is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability’’). This Court’s prior cases support the proposition that in some instances one brand of a product can constitute a separate market. [Citations.]

   The second element of a §2 claim is the use of monopoly power ‘‘to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.’’ [Citation.] If Kodak adopted its parts and service policies as part of a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, it will have violated §2. [Citations.]

   As recounted at length above, respondents have presented evidence that Kodak took exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly and used its control over parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak service market. Liability turns, then, on whether ‘‘valid business reasons’’ can explain Kodak’s actions. [Citations.] * * *

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   In the end, of course, Kodak’s arguments may prove to be correct. It may be that its parts, service, and equipment are components of one unified market, or that the equipment market does discipline the aftermarkets so that all three are priced competitively overall, or that any anti-competitive effects of Kodak’s behavior are outweighed by its competitive effects. But we cannot reach these conclusions as a matter of law on a record this sparse. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying summary judgment is affirmed.

   It is so ordered.