We again note that a claim for personal injuries by a tenant can be premised on three distinct legal theories: contract (a rental agreement), common law obligations imposed on a landlord, and the Washington Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973 (Landlord-Tenant Act), [citation]. * * *

Here, the tenants claim that they became sick from drinking contaminated well water provided as part of their tenancy. The trial judge dismissed all of their causes of action—contract, Landlord-Tenant Act, and common law—concluding that the Landlord-Tenant Act limited all rights to those specifically enumerated in the act. We conclude that the tenants’ showing on summary judgment is sufficient to support causes of action based on contract, the Landlord-Tenant Act, and the common law. We therefore reverse the summary dismissal of their claims.

        Facts

Robert Hayford bought a lot and mobile home in Kennewick, Washington from Mike Kirby in 1994. A domestic well supplied water to the home. The well water was tested on December 8, 1993. On March 15, 1994, the Benton Franklin District Health Department wrote to Mr. Kirby that: (1) the nitrate level of the well water was 8.8 mg/L; (2) the well was free of bacterial contamination; (3) the sanitary seal was improperly installed and maintained; and (4) chemicals were stored within 100 feet of the well. And ‘‘to protect and improve’’ the water system, the health department recommended that: (1) the sanitary seal be properly installed; and (2) the chemicals be stored at least 100 feet from the well. The health department also recommended that the well be tested yearly * * *

Mr. Hayford ‘‘thumbed through’’ the report but depended on his real estate agent to call any problems to his attention. And the agent apparently did not.

Mr. Hayford leased the home to Don Tucker and Shalee Miller (now Tucker) in October of 1998. Mr. and Ms. Tucker asked if the well water was drinkable. Mr. Hayford said it was as long as a ‘‘Brita’’ filter was used. He said that the nitrates were a bit high.

The Tuckers have four children, one was born after they moved out of the home. The Tuckers signed a written residential lease prepared by Mr. Hayford. They ultimately extended the tenancy through August 1, 2000. The Tucker family all became ill. The family’s pediatric nurse practitioner suggested that they test their well water. The test, dated March 28, 2000, showed bacteria in the water. The Tuckers told Mr. Hayford. He had the well repaired and that solved the problem.

The Tuckers moved out of the home on May 15, 2000. They sued Mr. Hayford for damages for personal injury arising from contaminated water. Mr. Hayford moved for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the landlord’s legal obligations were ultimately governed by the Landlord-Tenant Act. And, relying on our decision in Dexheimer, the judge concluded that the Tuckers were not entitled to personal injury damages under the act. He also concluded that Mr. Hayford had no notice of any defect. And he dismissed the Tuckers’ complaint.

Discussion

The Tuckers sued for damages based on their contract (obligation to perform major maintenance and repair, and covenant of quiet enjoyment); violation of the Landlord-Tenant Act; and negligent misrepresentation as to the water quality. We evaluate the viability of each claim.

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Contract Claims

Obligations Imposed by This Contract
* * * The tenant may recover for personal injuries caused by the landlord’s breach of a repair covenant only if the unrepaired defect created an unreasonable risk of harm to the tenant. The Restatement (Second) of Torts §357 (1965) provides that the lessor of land is liable if (a) the lessor has contracted to keep the land in repair; (b) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk that performance of the lessor’s agreement would have prevented; and (c) the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care in performing the agreement. [Citation.] The contract defines the extent of the duty when a landlord’s duty arises out of a covenant.

Both the trial court and Mr. Hayford, here on appeal, rely on our decision in Brown for the proposition that the landlord must have notice of the ‘‘defect’’ before he is subject to liability. * * * We do not read our decision in Brown so broadly.

In Brown the landlord had notice of the tenant’s problem (a high door sill). The holding in Brown turned on the nature of the claimed defect, not notice. * * * The court ultimately held that the landlord would not be liable under the contract’s safety provision because the door sill was not then unreasonably unsafe. Brown did * * * adopt portions of the Restatement of Torts which are relevant to the claims here:

The lessor’s duty to repair * * * is not contractual but is a tort duty based on the fact that the contract gives the lessor ability to make the repairs and control over them. * * * Unless the contract stipulates that the lessor shall inspect the premises to ascertain the need of repairs, a contract to keep the interior in safe condition subjects the lessor to liability if, but only if, reasonable care is not exercised after the lessee has given him notice of the need of repairs.

[Citations.] Notice then under this provision of the Restatement becomes an issue when the particular condition under consideration is inside the residence where the landlord has no right to enter. But that is not the case here. The source of water here was an outside well, which the landlord had physical access to. Actual notice is not then required.

Here the lease includes (1) an express covenant of quiet enjoyment and (2) requires that the lessor maintain and repair the leased premises.

So the factual question is the usual threshold question where the claim has been dismissed on motion—whether the condition of this well interfered with their quiet enjoyment of the home, or whether the well required ‘‘major maintenance’’ as spelled out in the lease agreement.

Quiet Enjoyment

No Washington case directly addresses the impact of drinking water on one’s quiet enjoyment of his home. Washington does, however, recognize the relationship of water and habitability. In [citation] the court held that without water, a property is uninhabitable. [Citation.] * * * Other jurisdictions have also held that a property without potable water is uninhabitable.

It is well settled that unsafe drinking water renders a home uninhabitable. And that by definition interferes with the quiet enjoyment of the home. The Tuckers have made out an actionable claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment if we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the Tuckers.

Major Maintenance and Repair

A health inspector recommended that this well be tested at least annually for bacteria. The question then is whether a reasonable person knew or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known that this well should have been tested annually—as part of the major maintenance of this home. Again, the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the Tuckers, includes high nitrate levels together with a recommendation for yearly bacteria testing. That is a sufficient showing to support a breach of the major maintenance and repair covenant of this lease, if proved.

Duties at Common Law

Traditional Common Law Landlord Liability

Common law landlord liability requires a showing: ‘‘(1) latent or hidden defects in the leasehold (2) that existed at the commencement of the leasehold (3) of which the landlord had actual knowledge (4) and of which the landlord failed to inform the tenant.’’ [Citation.] The landlord need not discover obscure defects or dangers, nor does the law impose any duty to repair defective conditions. [Citation.] A ‘‘landlord is liable only for failing to inform the tenant of known dangers which are not likely to be discovered by the tenant.’’ [Citation.]

The Tuckers moved into this home in 1998. The well was last tested in 1993. It was not tested again until after the Tuckers tested it in 2000. But this was after the Tuckers got sick. It had not then been tested for the five years prior to the Tuckers’ moving in despite a recommendation by the health department that it be tested annually. This well was not then maintained at the time the property was leased to the Tuckers. And the condition of the water was certainly hidden or latent as to the Tuckers. Mr. Hayford did not warn the Tuckers. Mr. Hayford was aware of the report that required the annual testing. The Tuckers have then raised an issue of fact—whether Mr. Hayford knew or should have known of this latent defect.

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Implied Warranty of Habitability

A landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and others upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his subtenant by a dangerous condition existing before or arising after the tenant has taken possession, if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the condition and the existence of the condition is in violation of:

1. an implied duty of habitability; or
2. a duty created by a statute or administrative regulation. Restatement (Second) of Property §17.6 (1977).

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Residential Landlord-Tenant Act

The Tuckers next argue that contrary to our holding in Dexheimer v. CDS, Inc., the Landlord-Tenant Act allows a remedy for personal injury damages.

The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (Uniform Landlord-Tenant Act) was drafted by the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws in 1972. [Citation.] While Washington made ‘‘substantial changes’’ to the Uniform Landlord-Tenant Act when it adopted its own Landlord-Tenant Act, our state’s version still reflects a ‘‘strong [Uniform Landlord-Tenant Act] influence.’’ [Citation.] * * * The purpose of the Uniform Landlord-Tenant Act was twofold: ‘‘‘simplify, clarify, modernize and revise’’’ landlord and tenant law, and to ‘‘‘encourage landlords to maintain and improve the quality of housing.’’’ [Citation.]

Washington’s Landlord-Tenant Act

The Landlord-Tenant Act requires the landlord to ‘‘keep the premises fit for human habitation’’ and to particularly maintain the premises in substantial compliance with health or safety codes for the benefit of the tenant. [Citation.] It requires the landlord to make repairs, except in the case of normal wear and tear, ‘‘necessary to put and keep the premises in as good condition as it by law or rental agreement should have been, at the commencement of the tenancy.’’ [Citation.]

It lists the landlord’s obligations. [Citation.] And it lists the tenant’s remedies: (1) terminate the rental agreement; (2) ‘‘[b]ring an action in an appropriate court, or at arbitration if so agreed, for any remedy provided under this chapter or otherwise provided by law;’’ or (3) pursue the other remedies available under the Landlord-Tenant Act. [Citation.]

Dexheimer

In Dexheimer, we rejected a tenant’s claim for tort damages following breach of the Landlord-Tenant Act. We concluded that the tenant’s remedies for the landlord’s breach of [citation] were limited to only those remedies specifically set forth in our Landlord-Tenant Act. [Citation.] Other jurisdictions allow a tenant’s cause of action arising from statutory duties under its versions of the Uniform Landlord-Tenant Act. And Washington commentators appear to agree. We conclude that the Washington Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973 provides a cause of action for the injury sustained here.

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We reverse the trial court’s summary judgment order.