We must decide whether a mail solicitation for internet service is deceptive as a matter of law within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

   In the late nineties, Ian Eisenberg and Chris Hebard formed Electronic Publishing Ventures, LLC (‘‘EPV’’) and its four subsidiaries: Cyberspace.com, LLC, Essex Enterprises, LLC, Surfnet Services, LLC, and Splashnet .net, LLC. Two offshore entities, French Dreams Investments, N.V. (owned by Eisenberg) and Coto Settlement (controlled by Hebard) owned EPV in equal parts.

   Between January 1999 and mid-2000, EPV’s four subsidiaries mailed approximately 4.4 million solicitations offering internet access to individuals and small businesses. The solicitations included a check, usually for $3.50, attached to a form resembling an invoice designed to be detached from the check by tearing at the perforated line. The check was addressed to the recipient and the recipient’s phone number appeared on the ‘‘re’’ line. The attached invoice-type form included columns labeled ‘‘invoice number,’’ ‘‘account number,’’ and ‘‘discount taken.’’ The back of the check and invoice contained small-print disclosures revealing that cashing or depositing the check would constitute agreement to pay a monthly fee for internet access, but the front of the check and the invoice contained no such disclosures. Along with the check/invoice document, most of the solicitations also included an advertising insert touting the importance of good internet access. The back of the insert explained in small print that a monthly fee would be billed to the customer’s local phone bill after the check was cashed or deposited.

   At least 225,000 small businesses and individuals cashed or deposited the solicitation checks. The EPV subsidiaries used a billing aggregation service to place charges for $19.95 or $29.95 a month on the small businesses’ and individuals’ ordinary telephone bills. Internet usage records show, however, that less than one percent of the 225,000 individuals and businesses billed for internet service actually logged on to the service.

   Eisenberg and Hebard were aware that the solicitation had misled some consumers. The companies received complaints from recipients of the solicitations which indicated that some customers had deposited the solicitation check without realizing that they had contracted for internet services. Materials that Eisenberg and Hebard prepared in an attempt to sell one of the subsidiaries in 1999 informed prospective buyers that ‘‘the Company believes that a number of customers sign up for the [sic] without realizing that when they deposit the check that they have ordered Internet service.’’ In June 2000, after the companies had ceased mailing solicitations to consumers, Cyberspace.com, the largest of the four subsidiaries, commissioned a consumer research study which found that 87.9 percent of 256 participants who actually read the language on the back of the solicitation understood that the act of cashing or depositing the check would constitute agreement to purchase internet service.

   Based on its belief that the solicitations were deceptive in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (‘‘FTCA’’), the Federal Trade Commission (‘‘FTC’’) sought an injunction and consumer redress in the district court * * *. The district court entered two stipulated permanent injunctions in which the defendants agreed to cease the practices at issue without admitting to a FTCA §5 violation. The parties then filed crossmotions for summary judgment on the issues of liability and consumer redress.

   After denying the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the district court granted the FTC’s motion in part. The court concluded that the solicitation violated FTCA §5 as a matter of law. * * * The district court * * * concluded that the proper amount of consumer redress was $17,676,897.

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   Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits ‘‘deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.’’ FTCA §5(a)(1), [citation]. As we have previously explained, a practice falls within this prohibition (1) if it is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances (2) in a way that is material. [Citations.]

   In this case, Hebard and EFO contend that the fine print notices they placed on the reverse side of the check, invoice, and marketing insert preclude liability under FTCA §5. We disagree. A solicitation may be likely to mislead by virtue of the net impression it creates even though the solicitation also contains truthful disclosures.

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   Here, Hebard and EFO’s mailing created the deceptive impression that the $3.50 check was simply a refund or rebate rather than an offer for services. The check was made out to the individual or small business to whom it was sent, with the consumer’s phone number in the ‘‘re’’ line. The portion of the document that resembled an invoice included columns labeled ‘‘invoice number,’’ ‘‘account number,’’ and ‘‘discount taken,’’ implying a preexisting business relationship for which a refund check was being offered. The front of the check and invoice lacked any indication that by cashing the check, the consumer was contracting to pay a monthly fee. As the district court reasoned, ‘‘[t]he receipt of a check, the perusal of which would reveal no obvious mention of an offer for services, no product information, and no indication that a contract is in the offing, coupled with an invoice that has no advertising or solicitation purpose, creates an overall impression that the check resolves some small, outstanding debt.’’ Based on the foregoing, we agree with the district court that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the solicitation was not likely to deceive consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.

   Our conclusion is bolstered by undisputed evidence indicating that Hebard and EFO’s solicitation actually deceived nearly 225,000 individuals and small businesses. Hebard and EFO billed each of these consumers for a service that less than one percent of them ever attempted to use. It is reasonable to infer that most of the remaining 99 percent did not realize they had contracted for internet service when they cashed or deposited the solicitation check. Although ‘‘[p]roof of actual deception is unnecessary to establish a violation of Section 5,’’ [citation], such proof is highly probative to show that a practice is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. We cannot accept Hebard’s and EFO’s contention that the nearly 225,000 consumers billed for unwanted internet service acted unreasonably when they cashed or deposited the solicitation check 

   We further conclude that the solicitation was likely to mislead in a way that is material. A misleading impression created by a solicitation is material if it ‘‘involves information that is important to consumers and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding, a product.’’ [Citation.] Here, the misleading impression the solicitation created—that the check was merely a refund or rebate—clearly made it more likely that consumers would deposit the check and thereby obligate themselves to pay a monthly charge for internet service.

   In sum, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the FTC on the FTCA §5 violation because no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the solicitation was not likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances in a way that is material. [Citation.]

   The results of the consumer research study Cyberspace.com commissioned do not undermine our conclusion. As EFO’s counsel conceded at oral argument, the survey results stand only for the proposition that most consumers can understand the fine print on the back of the solicitation when that language is specifically brought to their attention. Importantly, the survey did not probe whether the notices were sufficiently conspicuous to draw the survey subjects’ attention in the first place.

   Similarly, the fact that the companies provided consumers a toll free number to call for refunds does not affect our conclusion that the solicitation violated FTCA §5. [Citation.]

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   AFFIRMED.