The game is played in noneooperative fashion, with simultaneous moves by eaeh player.

a] Suppose neither player ean gather any additional information. Verify that equilibrium payoffs are 7 for Row and 7 for Column. (Here they play the game defined by the expeeted value of the two matrices.)

b] Suppose Row gets perfect information before acting. Column knows this and Row knows that Column knows, and so on. Verify that an equilibrium has Row play down no matterwhat state occurs, and Column play right, with expected payoffs of 6 for each. (Here Row has four strategies: up no matter what; down no matter what;

up in state one and down in state two; and vice versa.) How do you explain the equilibrium? Is Row better off with the information?

e] Suppose both Row and Column get perfect information. Determine and interpret the competitor's equilibrium behavior.

AppendixLO1