The EFV has been labeled, “The wrong weapon for the wrong war at the wrong time.” Do you agree or disagree with this characterization? Why? In 2011, one of the most complex and difficult congressional budget decisions in years finally determined the fate of the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle

(EFV). Given the numerous delays, tests, conditional approvals, and retests, the EFV had been no stranger to controversy. Although the EFV was loudly defended by senior officers in the Pentagon, a growing army of critics cited the vehicle’s poor test performance, and costs continued to balloon. As one reporter noted, “After 10 years and $1.7 billion, this is what the Marine Corps got for its investment in a new amphibious vehicle: a craft that breaks down about an average of once every 4.5 hours, leaks, and sometimes veers off course.” The biggest question is, how did things get to that point with what was viewed for many years as one of the Marine Corps’ highest priority acquisition programs?

The EFV program began more than 20 years ago when this armored amphibious vehicle was designed to replace the 1970s-era Amphibious Assault Vehicle.

The purpose of vehicles such as the EFV is to provide armored support for the early stages of amphibious assault onto enemy shores. The EFV was designed to roll off a Navy assault ship, move under its own power at 20 mph on the water’s surface for distances up to 25 miles while transporting a Marine rifle squad (up to 17 Marines), cross hostile beaches, and operate on shore.

The EFV was moderately armored and carried a 30-mm cannon in a turret for offensive firepower. The EFV often was described as a Marine Corps variant of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.

The EFV began as a state-of-the-art acquisition program for the Department of Defense (DoD). Following a concept exploration phase to determine the viability of the project that began in 1988, the project entered a program definition and risk reduction phase during which it was considered “a model defense acquisition program,”

winning two DoD awards for successful cost and technology management. The original contract was awarded to General Dynamics Corporation in June 1996 for full engineering and design work, and that corporation was awarded a subsequent contract for the system development and demonstration (SDD) phase of the program in July 2001. It is during this critical stage that all the complex engineering, systems development, and functionality of the program must be successfully demonstrated.

Perhaps unwisely, General Dynamics budgeted only 27 months for total testing and system verification.