03 Revenue equivalence ll 3 Points lConsider an all-pay, sealed-bid auction where the item goes to the highest bidder and all ofthe buyers pay what they bid. Assume that buyer valuations follow a uniformeJ} distribution. Use the revenue equivalence theorem to nd the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy Me}. Submit an image file showing the bidding function MU) and your work in deriving it. E Please select lefs] Select file[s}l Save Answer 04 Revenue equivalence Ill 3 Points Consider a sealedbid auction in which the highestbidder wins and pays the amount thatthey bid and the lowest bidder receives a payment equal to the difference between the first- and secondhighest bids. Does this auction pay the seller the same revenue as the four standard auctions? {That is, does the revenue equivalence theorem apply here?]: Why or why not? Ele specific