1. 15 points | Bargaining over externalities in energy from coal In a region live P people and C coal power plants. The power plants pollute the air, hurting the people, but generate profit to the coal-burning plants. Suppose that the people and the coal-burning industry, as two entities, meet to negotiate over pollution and profits. Suppose that the only two options are for plants to continue as before, or to all shut down. - If plants run as before, the coal-burning industry gets total profit Ca and the people total welfare P(b - h), where b is a baseline and h the hurt from coal- burning pollution. - If plants all shut down, the coal-burning industry gets total profit 0 and the people total welfare Pb. Lastly, suppose that, if they cannot come to an agreement, plants can operate as before. a3. Suppose that Cat > Ph, i.e. the profit from generating pollution exceeds the harm from it. What is the surplus, coal-burning industry's welfare, and compensation if any, under the Nash bargaining solution? (Box all three answers.) b6. Suppose the opposite, that Cat