1. (25 points) Consider the following game: a. Find all pure and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of this game by using the method we developed in Chapter 7 (Simultaneous-Move Games: Mixed Strategies) by finding the best response curves for each player. Explain how you find the Nash equilibria clearly. b. Graph the best response curves of Bart and Lisa on a p-q coordinate plane. Mark all Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies. c. Calculate expected payoff of each player for all pure and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria you have found in part a. 1. (25 points) Consider the following game: a. Find all pure and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of this game by using the method we developed in Chapter 7 (Simultaneous-Move Games: Mixed Strategies) by finding the best response curves for each player. Explain how you find the Nash equilibria clearly. b. Graph the best response curves of Bart and Lisa on a p-q coordinate plane. Mark all Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies. c. Calculate expected payoff of each player for all pure and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria you have found in part a