1. (45 points) Consider the following game between two players, One and Two (the first number is always One's payoff, the second number is Two's). Restrict attention to pure strategies throughout. Two a One h One C D R 0, 5 3,3 Two 1, 2 5, 1 2, 4 4, 0 (a) (15 points) Find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). (b) (15 points) Find the Nash Equilibria (NE).(c) (10 points) Which of the equilibria you found in (a) and (b) feature non-credible promises? What are these promises and why are they non-credible? (d) (5 points) Is it possible to change the information sets in this game in such a way that none of the equilibria (NE or SPNE) will feature non-credible promises? Show how or explain why not