1 A small seaside village is populated by two individuals, 1 and 2. The villagers have access to fishing boats. which allows them to source sh for the village. Each villager h. = 1, 2 decides on an amount In of fish to extract. at a cost of Ih[:1:]+ rug}, i.e., the per unit cost of extraction is increasing in the total amount of sh caught. Villagers derive utility from the fish they extract net of the cost associated with such extraction: Uh = 31's xiii-'31 + 32h where H i:- [l is a preference parameter. {a} Derive the optimal level of sh extraction that would maximise the sum of utilities of the two individuals. [5] {b} Derive the Nash equilibrium if the two individuals simultane- ously choose the amounts 1:] and 9:2 of sh to extract none cooperatively. Compare and contrast your answer to the out- come in {a}. [10] {c} Suppose that the villagers interact repeatedly. How could the villagers use this repeated interaction to achieve the utilitarian outcome? {max 400 wrds} [5] {cl} How are common poof resources {such as sheries] managed in practice? What are the elements of successful common pool resource management? {max 4m words} [10]