1. According to Crouhy, "Following a series of failures and near-failures of large financial institutions between 2007 and 2009, boards professed ignorance of the risks that had been assumed in the pursuit of profit--and sometimes senior management offered the same excuse. In particular, the risk management function at many firms failed to attract the attention of senior management, or the boards, to the risk accumulated in structured financial products. One reason may have been a process of marginalization of the role of risk management in financial institutions during the boom years in the run-up to the crisis." Following the crisis, a debate therefore ensued about the role of corporate governance. About the key areas of debate, which of the following is the LEAST plausible; i.e., each is true except for which is not? A. Because banks have a uniquely complicated set of stakeholders, the usual solution of empowering shareholders (equity owners) may not be the complete governance solution. B. As the boards at all of the large failures during the crises lacked both banking expertise and expert insiders, there is a an obvious and high correlation between board composition (i.e., independence, banking expertise) and bank failure. C. Regulators have pushed banks set out a formal board-approved risk appetite. This risk appetite can be translated into an enterprise-wise set of risk limits, but definition and translation of "risk appetite" remains a work-in-progress. D. One of the key levers of the board in determining bank behavior on risk is control over compensation schemes. Some banks have begun to institute reforms such as making bonuses a smaller part of the compensation page, including bonus clawbacks and deferred payments to capture longer-term risks