1. Consider a monopolist 1with zero costs that serves two types of consumers. Type 1 have inverse demand function Pliml = Q $91 and Type 2 have inverse demand pg'g} = 21] gg. There are two Type 1 consumers and there is one Type '2 consumer. [a] Suppose that the monopolist third degree price discriminates. What {linear} price does it charge to each type of consumer? Horasr much prot does the monopolist receive? {h} Suppose that the monopolist must set a uniform linear price. 1'ai'il'hat price does it set? HEW much prot does it receive? [c] Suppose the monopolist can perfectly price discriminate by offering different twopart tariffs to the dilferent types. What are the two part taril [perunit price and xed fee]? How much prot does the monopolist receive? {d} Suppose the monopolist cannot distinguish consumers 1'eitante'1 and decides to olfer a single twopart tariff where the perunit price is p = II}. What xed fee will the monopolist charge? How much prot does the monopolist receive? [e] Based on your answer to part [c]1 is the monopolist able to capture the entirety of the total surplus generated by its two-part. tariff? And is total surplus maximized? [f] Norar suppose that the monopolist still cannot distinguish consumers \"ex ante" adheres to the following pricing scheme: I Perunit price is p = D. I Lump-sum fee is F = 4WD if consumer purchases Q E 41]). I Lump-sum fee is F = X if consumer purchases 401] :2 Q E 12110. Suppose that X is chosen to maximize the monopolist's prot. What is X? HEW much prot does the monopolist receive