1. Consider the following stage game. L M H L 39,39 33,44 21,42 M 44,33 36,36 20,30 H \"In For motivation, think of this as a Cournot type game with L being low output, M, medium output, and H high output. (a) The stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium (NE). What is it? (b) Call mutual play of (L, L) cooperation. In the repeated game with a common discount factor 6, what is the smallest value of 5 for which mutual play of (L, L) can be supported as a NE via Nash reversion? (c) Is the repeated game NE in b) subgame game perfect? (d) In the stage game, what is the minmax payoff for player 1? (e) In the repeated game, in any supbgame perfect equilibrium, what is the lowest payoff average that player 1 can receive in any continuation game