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1. Finn and Poe are playing a game in which each can play either of two strategies, ignore or smile. If both play the strategy
1. Finn and Poe are playing a game in which each can play either of two strategies, "ignore" or "smile". If both play the strategy "ignore", then each gets a payoff of $400. If both play the strategy "smile", then each gets a payoff of $800. If one plays "smile" and the other plays "ignore", then the one who plays "smile" gets a payoff of $C and the one who plays "ignore" gets a payoff of $D. 1a Define Nash equilibrium 1b When is the outcome where both play "ignore" a Nash equilibrium? Choose from below, and justify your answer. 1. Never, since $800 > $400. 2. When $400 > $Cand $D > $800 but not when $800 > $D. 3. When $D > $Cand $C> $400. 4. Whenever $D < $800. 5. Whenever $400 > $C
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