1) .i) EL H M L H 4,4 12,8 20,12 CX M 8,12 16,16 24,20 L 12,20 20,24 28,28 Old rivals and powerful mutants, Charles Xavier (CX) and Eric Lensherr (EL), are simultaneously deciding how much effort to put into fighting each other's influence on younger mutants. They can decide to put in one of the three levels of effort: High (H), Medium (M) and Low (L). Effort is costly. When both increase their effort symmetrically they cancel out each other's in- fluence and the higher effort cost reduces their net utility. When they pay more effort than the other, they win in the influence-game. The net utility payoffs from the resulting interaction is given in the table. What is Charles' best responses to each of Eric's strategies? What is Eric's best responses to each of Charles' strategies? What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game