1) I need some help with the following question the class is Economics. The topics is in oligopoly

Oligopoly Two identical firms have a cress to a spring . Their marginal cost of bottling water from the spring is a constant 108 per bottle . The market demand for bottled spring water is P = 250 - 20 0 , where Pis the price ( in cents perbottle ) and is the quantity demanded ( in hundreds of bottles ) Thes ) . ( a ) Suppose the two firms form a successful cartel ( i . e . they will act as a monopoly and share the resulting profits ) . How much bottled water will the firms produce , and what price will they charge ? ( 6 ) Suppose the firms behave as in the Bertrand model of oligopoly . How much bottled water will the firms produce , and what price will they charge ( C ) Suppose the firms behave as in the Cournot model of oligopoly . How much bottled water will the a water firms produce , and what price will they charge ( d ) Comment on your findings - what does each model in parts ( a ) , ( b ) , and ( c ) imply and is it consistent with what we typically observe in markets controlled by two producer