1. [IDSDS, psNE and msNE] Consider the following simultaneous-move game played by player 1 (in rows) and player 2 (in columns). Player 2 x y z Player 1 (a) Which strategy pairs survive the application of iterative deletion of strictly dom- inated strategies (IDSDS)? For player 2 (column player), strategy 2 is strictly dominated by y. We can then delete columnz, leaving us with the following reduced-form matrix. Player 2 X y Player1 For player 1 (row player), strategy a is strictly dominated by b. After deleting the row corresponding toe, we obtain Player 2 X y b Player1 0 mm 0' mm At this point, we cannot delete any more strategies for players 1 or 2 if we re- strict them to use pure strategies. However, if we allow player 1 to randomize between the strategies that provide the highest payo/,band c In particular, assigning a probabilityp to strategy b and the remaining probability 1 i p to strategy 0, player 1s expected payo/ when player 2 chooses strategy (in the left-hand column of the above matrix) is 5p+3(1-1- p)=2p+3 which is larger than player 1s payo/ from strategy d, 4, as long as2p+3 > 4, or solving for p, if p > %. Similarly, when player 2 chooses straegyy (in 1