1. In any two-player game, a Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies. Which of the following statements is true?

(a) A Nash equilibrium strategy cannot be strictly dominated.

(b) If the two players can jointly find a better strategy profile then the original profile is not a Nash equilibrium.

(c) You can always find a Nash equilibrium by using dominance solvability.

(d) (a) only.

(e) (a) and (b)

(f) All of (a) to (c).

2. In a congestion game, where each player has two choices, A and B, a Nash equilibrium will have:

(a) All players choosing A or all players choosing B

(b) If there are 100 players, some number greater than 0 will choose A and the rest will choose B.

(c) (a) and (b)

(d) A congestion game is one of negative externalities.

3. In a game with network externalities where each player has two choices, A and B, a Nash equilibrium will have:

(a) All players choosing A or all players choosing B

(b) If there are 100 players, some number greater than 0 will choose A and the rest will choose B.

(c) (a) and (b)

(d) Network externalities are negative externalities.

4. In a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, the support of a mixed strategy is the set of pure strategies that are accorded positive probability. The following are true of the support:

(a) It always consists of a single pure strategy.

(b) Among the strategies in the support, a single one has a strictly higher payoff than any others in the support.

(c) All strategies in the support have the same expected payoff.

(d) Any strategy not in the support will have strictly higher payoffs than at least one in the support.

(e) (b) and (c).

ASAP PLEASE ...ASAP