1. In Peters v the Queen [1998] HCA 7, Kirby J said (at p. 552):

To the extent that the accused puts forward idiosyncratic, bizarre, eccentric or peculiar beliefs to support an assertion of a want of dishonesty, such considerations go, in my opinion, only to the plausibility of the accused's evidence. If the tribunal of fact accepts the evidence and it sustains an absence of dishonesty at the relevant time, it will sustain an acquittal where dishonesty is an essential ingredient of the offence. Fear of hordes of modern Robin Hoods, galloping into the court rooms of the nation, in company with anti-vivisectionists, environmentalists and other people affirming minority beliefs (so often raised as a spectre in these cases) should neither be exaggerated nor overstated.

Should the accused's motive be taken into account to a greater extent than it currently is, when determining whether he or she should be held liable for larceny?

2. Note the similarity between Wilson and Dawson JJ's approach in Ilich(1987) 162 and s 61E(6) of the Crimes Act(see class 10). Has the person who has 'consented' because of a mistaken belief, made a free choice to transfer property/engage in sexual activity?

In llich, Wilson and Dawson JJ state that the transferor's apparent consent will be negated where it is given only because of one of 3 'fundamental mistakes'. Three categories of mistake:

1. Mistakes as to the identity of the transferee - if you hand money to someone thinking they are someone else there is no consent
2. Mistake as to the identity of the thing being delivered
3. Mistake as to quantity