1 . Individual Problems 15-2 ols Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes "cancel each other out." They each gain 14 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 14 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 7 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mrs. Ward Vote Don't Vote Vote Mr. Ward: -7, Mrs. Ward: -7 Mr. Ward: 7, Mrs. Ward: -14 Mr. Ward Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -14, Mrs. Ward: 7 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to and for Mrs. Ward to J . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility. Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election. True or False: This agreement would increase utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question. O True O False