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1: Second-Price Sealed-Bid Assume there are n bidders indexed by i = 1 . . . n. Assume the following valuations of the bidders: v1

1: Second-Price Sealed-Bid Assume there are n bidders indexed by i = 1 . . . n. Assume the following valuations of the bidders: v1 > v2 > > vn. (1) So bidder n has the lowest valuation of all the bidders. Find a Nash Equilibrium of a second-price sealed-bid auction in which player n (i.e. the player with the lowest

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