1. Summary of article

2. Describe the legal issues

3. Describe the conclusion of the case

a. Factual Background Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are undisputed Defendants are two member hospitals of the Mount Sinai Health System Def. '5 Hot. Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 86. Plaintiff suffers from several progressive neurological and orthopedic conditions for which she seeks treatment at Defendants' facilities. Pi. Depo. Tr. 23, ECF No. 961; J. Krist Depo. Tr. 4?. ECF No. 962. Since 2008, she has been assisted bi, service dog who accompanies Plaintiff to medical appointments and aids her with a variety of other tasks. PL Depo. Tr. 23,26. Both animals have served in this capacityrst Bocci, who passed away in or around 201 ?, and then Beauhave been properly trained and registered wi the United States Service Dog Registry and Service Dog Registration of America. Id. at 26. 28-29. when visiting Defendants' facilities, Plain service dog wears a service jacket and tags reecting these registrations. Id. at 2?, 30. Plaintiffs husband, Joseph Krist, also accompanies l to many health appointments. Id. at 41. For their part. M531 and MSH have adopted nearly identical written policies that prohibit discrimination [*3] based a patients use of a sen animal. In relevant part. these policies read: Individuals with disabilities accompanied by service animals shall be allowed in all areas of the [facility]. .. . when it is not obvious what service an animal provides. only limited inquiries are allowed. Staff may ask if the dog is a service animal required because of a disability and what work or task the dog has been trained to perform... . Staff may not ask about the person's disability. require medical documentation. require a speciai identication card or training documentation for the [animal], or ask that the [animal] demonstrate its ability to perform the work or task... . A person with a disability cannot be asked to remove his service animal from the premises uniess (a) the dog is out of control and the handler does not take effective action to control it within a reasonable amount of time or (b) the dog is not housebroken... . In the event someone in the area of the service animal has asthma, allergies to the animal. or a phobia about animals, the {facility} shall modify its policies, practices, and procedures to permit a service animal to remain with a patient by, for example, moving the patient [*4] to another comparable room, changing staff schedules, or using other nondiscriminatory methods.. .. [The facility] shall instruct and train all medical personnel and staff, including security personnel, on die provisions of this policy upon hire and annually. MSBI Policy No. 20246, ECF No. 101-2; MSH Policy 112, ECF No. 102-1.. Pursuant to its Assisted Pet Therapy Program, which allows volunteers to bring pets into the facility, MSBI has enacted an additional policy. Resnick Depo. Tr. 62-63, ECF No. 135-1. MSBI Policy 203, whi is not shared by MSH, provides: Persons attempting to enter the hospital premises with animals must be questioned as to their business in the hospital. Once it has been determined that their visit is appropriate, and authorized according to hospital policy, they are to be asked if their animal is a pet. If they claim the animal is a service animal, they are to be allowed to enter without having to identify their disability or provide proof that the animal is a service animal. Persons and animals that are a part of the hospital Assisted Pet Therapy Program, will be authorized by the Volunteer Department, who will arrange for hospital ID. MSBI Policy 203, ECF [*5] No. 101-1. Defendants train their staff regarding these policies. This training begins during new employees' onboarding, and typically continues at least annually throughout each employees' tenure. Rubinstein Depo. Tr. 25-26, 46-47, ECF No. 116-4. During the pendency ofthis action, Defendants have taken additional steps to update and enhance their training procedures. Id. at 59-63; Arenas Depo. Tr. 4143, ECF No. 982. M531 and MSH patients who wish to le complaints may avail themselves of Defendants' grievance processes, which is overseen by Mount Sinai's centralized Patient Service Center. Rubenstein Depo. Tr. 52- 53. Patients are apprised of this option in several ways, including written notice, signs posted at Defendants' facilities, and resources available online. Id. at 8283. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff was allowed to bring her service dog into the treatment room during her visit with Dr. Sheikh. Plaintiff and Mr, Krist have each testied that Dr. Sheikh refused to see Plaintiff unless the dog remained in die waiting room with Mr. Krist. PI. Depo. Tr. at 2224: J. Krist Depo. Tr. at 4950. According to Plaintiff. Dr. Sheikh stated. "I'm allergic." PL Depo. Tr. at 5455. Dr. Sheikh claims the service dog was. in fact, present throughout the visit. sheikh Depo. Tr. 5759. Further. her undisputed testimony indicates that she treats about [*1] four patients with service animals each year. that she asks no questions of these patients regarding their service animals. that she is not allergic to dogs, and that she has neveriE declined to treat a patient accompanied by a service animal, nor requested a service animai's removal. Defs. 56.1 at 1111 32, 40. Plaintiff has testied that after her visit with Dr. Sheikh, she attempted without success to call and then to text message a number for a cell phone or landline she believed belonged to MSBI's head of neurology. PI. Depo. Tr. 8387. She aiso claims to have spoken inperson with another doctor concerning her visit with Dr. Shaikh. but her account of that conversation includes no service animal discussion. Id. at 8?. Plaintiff does not claim that she ever complained of service animal discrimination directly to Dr. Sheikh. On June 8, 2016, Plaintiff. accompanied by her husband and service dog, visited the Emergency Room at MSH after injuring her knee in a fall at her home. PI. Depo. Tr. 90-91. Upon arrival, MSH security guards asked Plaintiff to wait for at least ve minutes in the entrance with her service dog before placing her in a wheelchair and bringing her into the facility. [*8] Id. at 63; J. Krist Depo. Tr. 22. Plaintiff has further testied that "[t]he security guard wanted me to tie the dog out to the tree outside." PL Depo. Tr. 66. Once inside, she claims an unidentied triage nurse told her to "keep that thing away from me\" and another staff member wearing scrubs remarked that "you don't really need that dog because you're not blind." Id. at 6364. she recalls hospital staff moving her within the facility multiple times "because I was in the way and nobody wanted to have the dog anywhere near them.\" Id. at 93. At one point. Mr. Krist took the service dog outside to relieve itself and one of the security guards now on duty initially "didn't want to Iet [Mn Krist] bring [the dog] back in." Id. Plaintiff recalts complaining in the moment to MCH staff about how she Iwas being treated. Id. at 101. Apart from her time in the x-ray roomwhere, for safety reasons. service animals are not allowedPlaintiff was permitted to keep her service dog with he:r at all times. J. Krist Depo. Tr. 25-26. All told. hospital records indicate the visit lasted just under three hours and that Plaintiff was treated 30 minutes after seeing the triage nurse upon her arrival inside [*9] the Emergency Room. PI. Depo. Tr. 95-96. Plaintiff has testied that "they wanted me out of there so fast." Id. at 102. The following year, on October 4, 2017, Plaintiff visited Dr. Susan Boolbol at one of Defendants' facilities to have her blood drawn. Defs. 56.1 at 1 50. During the visit, one of Dr. Boolbol's nurses told Plaintiff that she "didn't want the dog there" because of her fear of dogs. PL Depo. Tr. 17, 106. Plaintiff assured the nurse that the dog was "not going to do anything to you." Id. at 106. Plaintiff was allowed to keep the dog with her throughout her visit, and in response to the first nurse's concerns, Dr. Boolbol's office arranged for a different nurse to draw Plaintiffs blood. Id. at 107; J. Krist Depo. Tr. 72-73. According to Plaintiff, Dr. Boolbol later "apologized and told the nurse that she shouldn't do that." PI. Depo. Tr. 18. Plaintiff has continued to visit Dr. Boolbol twice a year without any further incident involving her nurses. Id. at 41-42,112. Two months later, on December 8, 2017, on her way to an MRI appointment at one of Defendants' facilities, Plaintiff was stopped by a security guard who told her that she "couldn't come in with the dog." PI. [*10] Depo. Tr 16. The guard incorrectly stated that it was the facility's policy that Plaintiff could not enter with her service animal without "papers" for the dog. Id. at 16,113. Plaintiff has testified that she responded, "I'm not showing you any papers" and "[you're not allowed to ask," and that she then "kept right on going" into the building. Id. at 113. Upon being informed by his supervisors that he had misunderstood the service animal policy, the security guard immediately attempted to apologize to Plaintiff. Id. at 113-114; J, Krist Depo. Tr. 45-46. Unable to find Plaintiff, who by then was mid-treatment, he instead apologized to her husband, who refused to accept, telling the security guard, "you need to talk to [Plaintiff]." PL Depo. Tr. 113-14, J. Krist Depo. Tr. 46. When Plaintiff and her husband returned to the front desk area, that security guard was no longer there. PI. Depo. Tr. 114. Plaintiff continues to see the physician who ordered the December 8, 2017 MRI every three months. Id. at 44, 112. Plaintiff has also testified as to other instances in which she has hassled by security personnel at Defendants' facilities. "Four, five, six times a year they would get really [*11] under my skin" by telling Plaintiff her service animal is "the wrong breed," "not a service dog," or "the wrong size," by telling her she "can't bring a dog in," or by asking her for service animal "papers." PI. Depo. Tr. 48, 52, 74. On one occasion, she had to call up to the office manager who then intervened, allowing Plaintiff to enter with her service animal. Id. at 48. On all such occasions, Plaintiff has been allowed entry to be treated in Defendant's facilities with her service animal. Id. at 90-91, 107, 113. Plaintiff continues to frequent Defendants' facilities. Defs. 56.1 at 1 20.I. Legal Standards a. Summary Judgment Summary judgment [*13] is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). Thus, "a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient [to defeat a motion for summary judgment]." Id. at 252. "[T]he substantive law . .. identifies] which facts are material," and "[only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly prelude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248. "An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). At the summary judgment stage, the Court "construe[s] all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in its favor." Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 740 (2d Cir. 2010). Because credibility determination is the province of a jury, "[the evidence of [*14] the non-movant is to be believed." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, "[a] party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 310 (2d Cir. 2008) ("A party opposing summary judgment does not show the existence of a genuine issue of fact to be tried merely by making assertions that are conclus Nor may a party rely only on the "mere allegations or denials of his pleading." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986). Rather, the party opposing summary judgment "must proffer admissible evidence that sets forth specific facts showing a genuinely disputed factual issue that is material under the applicable legal principles." Major League Baseball Props. 542 F.3d at 310 (cleaned up).IV. NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims District courts have jurisdiction over state-lawI claims that are \"so related to claims in the action within [the district court's] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. 136?@1. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law ciaim where, inter alia, it "has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 23 U.S.C. 136?{c}_(g1. "[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law ciaims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrinejudicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comitywill point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction dyer the remaining state-lawI claims.\" Carnegie-Malian Univ. v. Cor-riff, 484 US. 343, 350 n.}', 108 5. (1.614, 98 L. Ed. 2d }'20 (1988). Thus, because the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act [*30] claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims. C0 NC LUS ION The Court therefore grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. Plaintiff's claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. Dated: New York, New York