1. Suppose in the market for real estate, a uniform distribution of old houses from $80,000 to $150,000 exist. The seller of each house knows its value and the "secrets" wrong with it), the value being v. There are also no full disclosure laws for what is wrong with each house. Buyers may not observe the value, but they can observe the distribution, and value each house 10% higher, 1.10 v. 18 to c. Derive the buyer's willingness to pay curve and the seller's willingness to sell curve. What is the equilibrium average value and price of a house on the market? Compare this result with if no asymmetric information existed. What percentage of houses is sold on the market with asymmetric information compared to perfect information? 1. Suppose in the market for real estate, a uniform distribution of old houses from $80,000 to $150,000 exist. The seller of each house knows its value and the "secrets" wrong with it), the value being v. There are also no full disclosure laws for what is wrong with each house. Buyers may not observe the value, but they can observe the distribution, and value each house 10% higher, 1.10 v. 18 to c. Derive the buyer's willingness to pay curve and the seller's willingness to sell curve. What is the equilibrium average value and price of a house on the market? Compare this result with if no asymmetric information existed. What percentage of houses is sold on the market with asymmetric information compared to perfect information