1. Suppose simultaneous moves are introduced into a two-stage game of complete and perfect information. How does the description of the game change? a. One-stage game b. Three-stage game c. Incomplete Information d. Imperfect Information 2. Consider a general two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. How do we denote the Nash equilibrium of stage 2 ? a. (a3(a1,a2),a4(a1,a2)) b. (a3(a1,a2),a4(a1,a2)) c. (a3(a1,a2),a4(a1,a2)) d. (a3(a1,a2),a4(a1,a2)) 3. How come players in stage 1 can anticipate the Nash equilibrium in stage 2 ? a. Perfect Information b. Complete Information c. Imperfect Information d. Incomplete Information 4. Which of the following is a solution of a static game of complete but imperfection information? a. Iterated Elimination b. Nash Equilibrium c. Backwards Induction d. Subgame Perfection 5. Consider a general two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. How do we denote the subgame-perfect outcome? a. (a1,a2,a3(a1,a2),a4(a1,a2)) b. (a1,a2,a3(a1,a2),a4(a1,a2)) c. (a1,a2,a3(a1,a2),a4(a1,a2)) d. (a1,a2,a3(a1,a2),a4(a1,a2))