1. Suppose there are two turns, A and B, operatlng 1n a market and compete on output choices. No other rms can enter the market. Suppose further that the market demand curve is: P = 24800 200(QA+QB) Further, suppose that the marginal costs for both rms is constant and equal to $800, and there are no xed costs. a. (1 point) Calculate and draw each rms best response function. Put Q A on the Y axis and QB on the X axis. 13. (1 points) Solve for the Nash Equilibrium output levels for each rm, and calculate the market price and the corresponding economic prots for each rm. Identify this point on the graph you drew in part a. c. (1 point) Suppose instead that the rm's colluded and acted like a single monopolist. So the market demand curve is now: P = 248000 200Q where Q = Q A+QB. Assume that MC = $800. Calculate the prot maximizing market output and price levels. Assume that each rms produces half of the market output and splits evenly the monopoly prot. What are the output and prot levels for each rm? d. (1 point) Suppose rm A believes that rm B will produce the output level identied in part c. Is it optimal for rm A to produce their output level identied in part C, or would there be another output level for rm A to maximize their own prots? Hint: Use your work in part A. c. (1 point) Given all this work, is this game a prisoner's dilemma? Explain fully