1. The table below shows expected payoffs (in $billions) for GM and the United Auto Workers (UAW) as they enter contract negotiations.

	UAW
Strike	Concede
GM	Bargain Hard	-20, -10	10, -5
Concede	-10, -2	-5, 0

a. Using game theory for a one-shot, simultaneous decision game, find all the Nash equilibria.

b. Each side enters negotiations threatening to take a hard line (Bargain Hard or Strike). Does either side have a credible threat? If so, which side?

2. The table below shows expected payoffs (in $billions) for Boeing and Airbus. Each has the resources to build only one new plane, either a jumbo or regular plane.

Airbus
Boeing		No New Plane	Regular	Jumbo
No new plane	0,0	0,10	0,8
Regular	10,0	7,7	-1,9
Jumbo	8,0	9,-1	1,1

a. Using game theory for a one-shot, simultaneous decision game, find all the Nash equilibria.

b. Identify any dominant strategies. (Just say Airbus, Regular for example)

c. Identify any dominated strategies.