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1. There are three bidders in an auction with one item whose values are drawn independently from U[4; 10]. (a) Find an equilibrium of the
1. There are three bidders in an auction with one item whose values are drawn independently from U[4; 10].
(a) Find an equilibrium of the second-price auction. (b) What is the expected payoff of a bidder with value v. (c) Using the revenue equivalence theorem and part (b), find an equilibrium of the first-price auction.
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